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Limiting Tax Expenditures
DAVID M. SCHIZER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government devotes over a trillion dollars each year to
tax provisions that pursue "nontax" goals, such as the deduction for
mortgage interest and the exclusion for employer-provided health in-
surance.' Scaling back these "tax expenditures ' 2 should be a high pri-
ority, as many have urged.3 Yet too often, the same limit is suggested
for a broad range of tax expenditures. In the 2013 budget deal, for
instance, Congress revived a single limit on all itemized deductions
called the "Pease rule."'4 In 2012, both presidential candidates pro-
* Dean Emeritus and the Harvey R. Miller Professor of Law and Economics, Columbia
Law School. I appreciate comments from Joshua Blank, Tom Brennan, Jake Brooks, Wei
Cui, Michael Doran, Victor Fleischer, Brian Galle, Michael Graetz, Glenn Hubbard, David
Joulfaian, Alex Raskolnikov, Michael Schler, Dan Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, Richard Squire,
Shlomo Yitzhaki, Eric Zolt, and workshop participants at the Tax Club, Columbia Law
School, the American Law and Economics Association, and Hebrew University.
1 William McBride, Tax Found., Fiscal Fact No. 391, A Brief History of Tax Expendi-
tures 1, 3 (2013), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff391.pdf. (ex-
plaining that Treasury estimates the tax expenditures budget is $1.2 trillion, and the Joint
Committee estimates $1.3 trillion, representing 96% growth since 1991); James R. Hines Jr.
& Kyle D. Logue, Understanding the AMT, and Its Unadopted Sibling, the AMxT, 6 J.
Legal Analysis 367, 373 n.23 (2014) (describing the tax expenditure budget as "a readily
available (if flawed) measure of federal tax preferences").
2 Congress defines tax expenditures as "revenue losses attributable to provisions of the
Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction, from gross in-
come a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, § 3, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012). They
are "analogous to direct outlay programs, and the two can be considered as alternative
means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives." Staff of the Joint Comm. on
Tax'n, Background Information on Tax Expenditure Analysis and Historical Survey of Tax
Expenditure Estimates 2 (2011), available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=
startdown&id=3740. This Article defers to Congress' definition, instead of entering the
traditional debate about which provisions are "special" enough to be tax expenditures.
See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget,
22 Nat'l Tax J. 244, 257-58 (1969). The focus here is not on their conceptual compatibility
with a particular tax base, but on the welfare effects of repealing or limiting them.
3 See Section II.B.
4 American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101(b)(2)(A), 126 Stat.
2313, 2317 (2013) (codified at IRC § 68); see Frank Armstrong III, Pease Limitation Puts a
Lid on Itemized Deductions for Wealthy Folks, Forbes, Jan. 9, 2013, http://www.forbes
.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/01/09/pease-limitation-puts-a-lid-on-itemized-deduc-
tions-for-wealthy-folks/.
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posed their own one-size-fits-all limit.5 In the same year, the United
Kingdom imposed a single cap on all personal deductions. 6 Likewise,
the Bowles-Simpson Commission, 7 Martin Feldstein, 8 Edward
Kleinbard, 9 and other distinguished commentators have each recom-
mended their own version of uniform treatment.10
Although one-size-fits-all answers may be good politics, they are
not good policy. What makes sense for the earned income tax credit
(EITC) is unlikely to work for green energy or charity. After all, each
tax expenditure encourages different behavior. In scaling it back, we
lose some private benefits and positive externalities. If these
"programmatic benefits" are meager, we have good reason to scale
back. Even if they are significant, reaping them at lower cost is desira-
ble. This Article canvasses five strategies for doing so: tightening the
definition of favored conduct; focusing on claimants who are easiest to
motivate; favoring claimants who use the subsidy more effectively; cal-
ibrating how much favored activity we subsidize; and changing the
government agency that administers the subsidy. The right strategy
depends on the relevant externalities, elasticities, and other context-
specific factors.
Repeal or a limit also can influence excess burden and distribution,
affecting labor and savings decisions, planning, and administrative
costs. For example, limits can push claimants into a higher tax
bracket. In some cases, a limit moves us closer to the distribution we
5 See James B. Stewart, Comparing the Tax Bite with Obama and Romney, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 3, 2012, at Bi.
6 The cap, introduced in the 2012 budget, is the greater of £50,000 or 25% of income.
See HM Treasury, A Fairer, More Efficient and Simpler Tax System (Mar. 12, 2012), http://
webarchive.nationaIarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/
budget20l2 fair-efficient-tax.htm.
7 See Nat'l Comm'n on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, The Moment of Truth 31
(2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/docu-
ments/TheMomentofTruthl2_l_2010.pdf (using "zero base budgeting" to eliminate all tax
expenditures).
8 See Martin Feldstein, Daniel Feenberg & Maya MacGuineas, Capping Individual Tax
Expenditure Benefits, 131 Tax Notes 505, 505-07 (May 2, 2011) (advocating an overall cap
on all itemized deductions, as well as some other tax expenditures, so that the tax benefit
does not exceed 2% of AGI).
9 Edward Kleinbard, We Are Better Than This: How Government Should Spend Our
Money 382 (2014) (proposing to replace all personal itemized deduction with a 15%
credit).
10 See Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and Tax
Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 24-25 (2006) (argu-
ing that the most efficient default structure for tax expenditures is a uniform refundable
credit, so that low-income and high-income taxpayers receive the same marginal reim-
bursement rate); Neil Warren, A Politically Viable Strategy for Limiting Personal Income
Tax Deductions: The Case for a Global Cap, 29 Austl. Tax F. 357, 359 (2014) (favoring
"the UK approach where the focus is on global caps rather than imposing specific caps on a
myriad of individual itemized deductions").
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want, while in others it takes us farther away. After all, some tax ex-
penditures focus especially on low-income people, while others do
not. Indeed, since low- and middle-income taxpayers are taxed at
much lower rates than thirty years ago, many tax expenditures offer
them a correspondingly reduced tax benefit.'1 Given the broad swath
of relevant issues, then, the analysis is too complex and multi-faceted
for one-size-fits-all answers. Instead, this Article offers a three-part
framework for limiting tax expenditures, focusing on programmatic
benefits, excess burden, and distribution.
This Article also analyzes seven different types of limits. Obviously,
each helps the government raise more revenue. In addition, each
raises the after-tax cost of favored activity, and also introduces com-
plexity to the tax system. But otherwise, these limits have very differ-
ent effects. For example, a "cap" eliminates the subsidy for high
levels of favored activity. A "fixed-dollar" cap defines this boundary
as a specified amount (for example, retirement savings above $18,000
per year12), while an "income-based" cap defines it as a percentage of
income (for example, charitable contributions above 50% of adjusted
gross income (AGI) 13). In contrast, a "floor" disallows the subsidy for
low levels of favored activity. Again, there are fixed-dollar floors (as
in proposals to disallow charitable deductions for contributions below
$50014) and income-based floors (as in proposals disallowing charita-
ble contributions below 1% of AGI15). Other limits preserve the sub-
sidy for both high and low levels of favored activity, but in weakened
form: A "haircut" disallows a fixed percentage of a deduction or ex-
clusion (for example, 50% of travel and entertainment expenses16); a
"maximum fraction" limits the tax benefit to a fixed percentage (for
example, capping the tax benefit from the charitable deduction at
28%, even for those in higher tax brackets);17 and a "phase-out"
reduces the tax benefit for high-income claimants.
11 See Eric M. Zolt, Inequality in America: Challenges for Tax and Spending Policies,
66 Tax L. Rev. 641, 686-88 (2013).
12 IRC § 401(k); Notice 2014-70, 2014-48 I.R.B. 905 (Nov. 24).
13 IRC § 170(b)(1)(B)(ii) (limiting deduction for individuals).
14 See Deena Ackerman & Gerald Auten, Floors, Ceilings, and Opening the Door for a
Non-Itemizer Deduction, 59 Nat'l Tax J. 509 (2006) (discussing proposal to add a fixed
dollar floor to the charitable deduction); cf. IRC § 165(h)(1) (disallowing casualty losses of
less than $100 per event).
15 See Ackerman & Auten, note 14, at 509 (discussing proposal to add a 1% floor to the
charitable deduction); cf. IRC § 67 (allowing miscellaneous itemized deductions, including
charitable contributions only to the "extent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds
2 percent of" AGI).
16 IRC § 274(n).
17 Cong. Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2014 to 2023, at 121 (2013),
available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44715-OptionsFor-
ReducingDeficit-3.pdf (proposing such a rule).
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Just as these various limits have diverse effects on programmatic
benefits, they also influence excess burden and distribution in differ-
ent ways. For example, some limits increase the effective marginal tax
rate (as do phase-outs and income-based floors), while others de-
crease it (as do income-based caps). Likewise, some especially reduce
the subsidy for high-income claimants (phase-outs, fixed-dollar caps,
haircuts, and maximum fractions), while others do not (income-based
floors, fixed-dollar floors, and income-based caps). As a result, each
limit has a different mix of strengths and weaknesses, making it a bet-
ter fit in some contexts than others.
Like limits, tax expenditures also vary in systematic ways, and this
Article identifies an important distinction among them: For some tax
expenditures, marginal benefits vary only with the activity level of all
claimants in the aggregate; for others, marginal benefits also vary with
the activity level of each claimant. When we subsidize green energy,
for instance, the aggregate is our main concern; the goal is to replace
as much carbon-based energy as possible, and it matters less who is
doing so (as long as they do it well enough). In contrast, when we
subsidize health insurance, we care a lot about how much insurance
each individual has. The difference between what this Article calls
"aggregate" subsidies (like green energy) and "individually-based"
subsidies (like health insurance) can influence the type of limit we
want.
For example, caps are likely to be a better fit for individually-based
subsidies than aggregate ones, since we care more about how much
each claimant claims. In deciding whether to impose a cap, we should
ask what happens when individual claimants engage in additional fa-
vored activity. Do the marginal programmatic benefits decline? If
they do, encouraging more activity stops being cost effective at a cer-
tain point. For example, what if a basic health insurance policy creates
positive externalities, but a more expensive "gold-plated" policy does
not add more?' 8 If this is the case, we should subsidize only basic
policies. Capping the subsidy saves money while preserving program-
matic benefits. A further advantage is that, unlike other limits, a cap
does not disallow more deductions as claimants earn more. By not
increasing a claimant's effective marginal rate in this way, a cap adds
less to excess burden.' 9 A cap also can improve distribution, since
high-income taxpayers are more likely to buy gold-plated policies. As
long as the marginal benefits from health insurance subsidies decline
in this way, then, a cap can advance all the goals. In contrast, we do
18 See Sven R. Larson, Lessons from Sweden's Universal Health System: Tales from the
Health-Care Crypt, 13 J. Am. Physicians and Surgeons 21, 21-22 (2008).
19 See Feldstein et al., note 8, at 506.
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not get the same "grand slam" in capping a green energy subsidy,
since marginal externalities for each claimant do not decline in the
same way. After all, installing one solar panel on every roof in a par-
ticular neighborhood is no better than two on every other roof. Either
way, we replace the same amount of carbon-based energy.
While capping health insurance could advance all our goals, it is
more typical for trade-offs to arise. Each limit offers a different mix
of trade-offs, which is a better fit for some subsidies than others. For
example, income-based floors involve a trade-off between program-
matic benefits and excess burden. They avoid subsidizing the first dol-
lar of favored activity, which is helpful if the targeted group would
engage in this activity anyway. At the same time, though, they in-
crease the effective marginal tax rate by disallowing more deductions
as claimants earn more. A similar trade-off arises with phase-outs.
There are programmatic advantages in excluding high-income claim-
ants, since they need less help and are more likely to engage in the
favored activity anyway. But phase-outs also increase the effective tax
rate. Whether a floor or phase-out makes sense in a particular context
depends on the empirical magnitude of these (and other) competing
effects. For example, a floor is a poor fit when the goal is to persuade
claimants to do what they are not already doing (for example, joining
the work force), but a good fit when the goal is to encourage more of
what they are already doing (for example, charity).
Empirics feature prominently in this analysis. As a result, since em-
pirical assessments are beyond this Article's scope, only tentative sug-
gestions-not definitive recommendations - are offered about
individual tax expenditures. Even so, the importance of empirics and
context has four further implications. First, there are advantages in
varying the subsidy rate, which this Article calls the "marginal reim-
bursement rate, ' 20 for different tax expenditures. Instead of using the
marginal tax rate, as we do for deductions and exclusions under cur-
rent law, we should rely on context-specific assessments of externali-
ties and elasticity. Second, we should tailor a separate limit for each
tax expenditure. For instance, instead of imposing a $25,000 cap on all
itemized deductions, as Mitt Romney proposed,21 we should use a
separate limit for each. Third, empirical research on these issues has
obvious value. Treasury should consider investing more in this re-
search, as well as sharing more data. Fourth, the marginal reimburse-
ment rate often should vary with income, notwithstanding the
20 See Daniel N. Shaviro, Fixing U.S. International Taxation 11 (2014) (coining this
term).
21 Stephen J. Entin, Tax Found., Analysis of Romney's Tax Plan With and Without a
$25,000 Cap on Itemized Deductions (Oct. 19, 2012), http://taxfoundation.org/article/analy-
sis-romneys-tax-plan-and-without-25000-cap-itemized-deductions.
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contrary recommendation of Lily Batchelder, Fred Goldberg, and Pe-
ter Orszag. 22
Needless to say, none of this is easy. Two problems loom especially
large in reforming tax expenditures. First, many of the relevant em-
pirical questions are quite difficult to resolve. There is only limited
evidence about the magnitude of relevant externalities, elasticities, la-
bor and savings distortions, and administrative costs. 23 Effects on dis-
tribution are also contested.24 Yet empirical uncertainty is a perennial
challenge in tax policy (and, indeed, in life). If we refuse to make
policy changes without full information, we (tacitly) commit to the sta-
tus quo. This is itself a decision based on imperfect information. In-
stead, we should do what we can with the limited information we
have.
Second, the political hurdles are quite daunting, since each tax ex-
penditure draws support from a range of interest groups. Real estate
developers, contractors, and mortgage lenders defend the mortgage
interest deduction, 25 while religious organizations, universities, and
museums support the charitable deduction,26 and so on. Overcoming
this opposition is especially difficult in a climate of partisan deadlock.
Even so, any effort to reduce the deficit has to disappoint someone.
Compared with the alternatives, limits on tax expenditures have a no-
table political advantage. Because they are complicated, limits are
less salient to voters.27 For example, we can increase effective margi-
nal rates not only by raising the stated rate, but also by disallowing
more deductions as taxpayers earn more. Because the Pease rule uses
22 Batchelder et al., note 10, at 24-25.
23 See, e.g., Cong. Budget Office, Pub. No. 4308, The Distribution of Major Tax Expend-
itures in the Individual Income Tax System (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/TaxExpenditures One-Column.pdf; Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Redistribu-
tion and Tax Expenditures: The Earned Income Tax Credit, 64 Nat'l Tax J. 689 (2011);
Michael Schuyler, Tax Found., Baked in the Cake: Why the Progressivity of the Income
Tax Isn't Visible in the Distribution of Tax Expenditures (Jan. 13, 2014), http://taxfounda-
tion.org/article/baked-cake-why-progressivity-income-tax-isn-t-visibIe-distribution-tax-
expenditures.
24 See James Poterba & Todd Sinai, Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing:
Deductions for Property Taxes and Mortgage Interest and the Exclusion of Imputed
Rental Income, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 84 (2008).
25 Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax
Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 Law Contemp. Probs. 233, 233 (2010).
26 Jerry Markon & Peter Wallsten, White House, Nonprofit Groups Battle over Charita-
ble Deductions, Wash. Post (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-
house-nonprofit-groups-battle-overcharitabe-deductions/2012/12/13/8Oe67400-43f2-1le2-
9648-a2c323a991d6_story.html.
27 See Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 Yale J.
on Reg. 253, 295-96 (2011); Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 59, 60-62
(2009).
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the latter approach,28 it is less visible to unsophisticated taxpayers. In
any event, political challenges should not keep us from considering
how to reform tax expenditures. After all, we need to know where we
want to go, even if it is hard to get there.
This Article contributes to an ongoing debate about the effective-
ness of subsidies and Pigouvian taxes. For example, Victor Fleischer
argues that we should "curb our enthusiasm" for these instruments
because the social benefits and costs of the targeted behavior vary for
different people; as a result, a uniform tax or subsidy is too generous
for some and insufficient for others. 29 To deal with this heterogeneity
and uncertainty, Brian Galle favors using different prices for different
people.30 This Article analyzes and classifies challenges associated
with heterogeneity, uncertainty, and other context-specific factors,
shows how daunting these challenges can be, and offers a range of
strategies for dealing with them.
In developing a three-part framework and analyzing different limits,
this Article focuses more on institutional design than does the public
finance literature on optimal tax and externalities. 31 At the same
28 IRC § 68(b)(1).
29 Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigouvian Taxes 15-18 (Univ. San Diego
Legal Studies, Paper No. 14-151, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2413066.
30 Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 Vanderbilt L. Rev. (forthcoming
2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2578096.
31 See, e.g., Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, Externalities and Op-
timal Taxation, 70 J. Pub. Econ. 343 (1998) (noting that the optimal mix of Pigouvian and
income taxes depends on the degree and type of information available, so that Sandmo's
additivity principle may not always apply); Peter Diamond, Optimal Tax Treatment of Pri-
vate Contributions for Public Goods With and Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. Pub.
Econ. 897 (2006) (incorporating tax-favored donations in optimal tax framework); Louis
Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation, 53 Int'l
Econ. Rev. 487 (2012) [hereinafter Optimal Control] (arguing that simple Pigouvian direc-
tive to set tax equal to marginal harm should not be modified in light of pre-existing labor
distortions or distributional goals); Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods
and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 Nat'l Tax J. 513 (1996) [hereinafter Optimal
Supply] (noting circumstances in which optimal supply of public goods can be determined
with simple cost-benefit calculus, without regard to distortionary costs of taxation); Yew-
Kwang Ng, The Optimal Size of Public Spending and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation,
53 Nat'l Tax J. 253 (2000) (arguing that incentive effects of both the public spending and
the accompanying tax must be considered, as well as their net distributional effect); Jukka
Pirttila & Ronnie Schob, Redistribution and Internalization: The Many-Person Ramsey
Tax Rule Revisited, 27 Pub. Fin. Rev. 541, 554 (1999) (developing many-person Ramsey
tax rules in model with externalities); Emmanuel Saez, The Optimal Treatment of Tax
Expenditures, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 2657 (2004) (arguing that optimal subsidy on "contribution
good" that provides both private and public benefits, such as charity, increases with the
price elasticity of contributions, the size of the public benefit, and the extent to which
public contributions crowd out private contributions); Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation in
the Presence of Externalities, 77 Swed. J. Econ. 86 (1975) (incorporating externalities in an
optimal tax framework and showing that usual commodity taxes based on elasticity must
be coupled with taxes and subsidies targeting externalities); Joel Slemrod & Shlomo
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time, this Article offers more general observations and prescriptions
than does the vast literature on specific tax expenditures, which in-
cludes work on the employer-provided health insurance exclusion,32
mortgage interest deduction,33 state and local tax deduction,34 EITC,35
charitable deduction,36 Pease Rule,37 alternative minimum tax,38 the
Romney cap and the alternative tax proposed by Warren Buffett,39 as
well as economic simulations of various proposals.40 Some other work
also operates at this intermediate level of generality. But this work
often comes to different conclusions, and considers only a subset of
the issues addressed here,41 including the effect of limits on marginal
Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions: The Marginal Cost of Funds and the
Marginal Benefit of Projects, 54 Nat'l Tax J. 189 (2001) (offering framework for evaluating
whether marginal dollar should be allocated to public project).
32 See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, John Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler,
Reforming the Tax Preference for Employer Health Insurance, 26 Tax Policy and the
Economy 43 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 2012); Jonathan Gruber, Taxes and Health Insurance,
in 16 Tax Policy and the Economy 37 (James M. Poterba ed., 2002).
33 See, e.g., Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden
Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 1347 (2000); Rebecca N.
Morrow, Billions of Tax Dollars Spent Inflating the Housing Bubble: How and Why the
Mortgage Interest Deduction Failed, 17 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 751 (2012); Ventry,
note 25.
34 See, e.g., John William Hatfield, Revenue Decentralization, the Local Income Tax
Deduction, and the Provision of Public Goods, 66 Nat'l Tax J. 97 (2013).
35 See, e.g., Anne Alstott, Why the Earned Income Tax Credit Doesn't Make Work Pay,
73 Law & Soc. Probs. 285 (2010).
36 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. Pub. Econ. 469 (1995);
David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the
Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 Tax L. Rev. 221 (2009).
37 See, e.g., Reed Shuldiner & David Shakow, Lessons from the Limitation on Itemized
Deductions, 93 Tax Notes 673, 678 (Oct. 29, 2001) (showing that the Pease Rule increases
effective marginal rates but does not affect the tax savings from the marginal deduction).
38 See, e.g., Hines & Logue, note 1, at 1-6 (defending the alternative minimum tax, while
also proposing an alternative maximum tax). Daniel Shaviro has also invoked the AMT as
evidence of congressional ambivalence about tax expenditures. Daniel Shaviro, Percep-
tion, Reality and Strategy: The New Alternative Minimum Tax, 66 Taxes 91, 92-93 (1988)
(describing enactment of AMT as a move from ambivalence to schizophrenia).
39 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The Bucket and Buffett Approaches to Raising Taxes on
High-Income US Individuals, 61 Can. Tax J. 425, 432 (2013) (offering brief critique of these
two specific proposals).
40 See, e.g., Ackerman & Auten, note 14, at 509 (finding that extending charitable de-
ductions to nonitemizers and adding a floor, as suggested by President Bush's 2005 tax
reform commission, would lead to greater efficiency and more contributions); Michael
Schuyler, Tax Found., Feldstein Proposal Increases Federal Revenues But the Devil's in
the Details (Apr. 30, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/feldstein-proposal-increases-
federal-revenues-devils-details; Eric Toder, Joseph Rosenberg & Amanda Eng, Evaluating
Broad-Based Approaches for Limiting Tax Expenditures, 66 Nat'l Tax J. 807, 817 (2013).
41 For example, James Hines and Kyle Logue focus only on the trade-off between
progressivity and the "nontax" policies pursued through tax expenditures, without incorpo-
rating excess burden into their analysis. Hines & Logue, note 1, passim. Likewise, in his
short piece, Shaviro focuses only on the Romney cap and the Buffett alternative tax and
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rates,42 the macroeconomic impact of tax expenditures, 43 the nontax
goals of tax expenditures,44 fairness,45 the nontransparent nature of
these limits, 46 and the advisability of uniformity. 47
While tax expenditures are a broad topic, they (and other subsidies)
are merely a subset of the policy instruments available to the govern-
ment. For example, instead of subsidizing favored behavior, the gov-
ernment can penalize disfavored behavior. Since these strategies are
mirror images, the analysis here can be relevant to Pigouvian taxes
and other penalties, although these connections are not the focus of
this Article. 48  Still another alternative-instead of carrots and
sticks-is for the government simply to require the behavior it wants
or to prohibit what it opposes. Since regulatory mandates are the sub-
ject of a robust literature,49 and involve a somewhat different mix of
costs and benefits, they are beyond this Article's scope.
Part II of this Article surveys a spate of proposals that use one-size-
fits-all limits. Part III develops the three-part framework and dis-
cusses five strategies for preserving programmatic benefits at lower
cost. Part IV analyzes seven limits and the trade-offs they involve.
Part V identifies two "grand slam" scenarios in which all the goals
does not seek to discuss the costs and benefits of various other limits and the trade-offs
they involve. Shaviro, note 39.
42 Elliott Manning and Laurence Andress show how limits on various tax expenditures
influence effective marginal rates, but they focus only on excess burden and not program-
matic incentives and distribution. Elliot Manning & Laurence M. Andress, The 1996 Mar-
ginal Federal Income Tax Rates: The Image and the Reality, 73 Tax Notes 1585 (Dec. 30,
1996). Martin Sullivan discusses different ways that caps influence effective marginal rates,
but does not discuss their effects on programmatic incentives and distribution, or the im-
pact of other limits (such as floors or fractions). Martin A. Sullivan, Deduction Caps Can
Raise Marginal Rates, Cut Economic Growth, 137 Tax Notes 939 (Nov. 26, 2012).
43 See Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency and Stability: The Importance of
Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 Yale J. on Reg. 45, 45 (2012).
44 Gregg Polsky proposes to analyze two types of tax expenditures differently in decid-
ing whether to repeal them. For distributional tax expenditures (which promote equity),
he focuses on fairness; yet for allocative tax expenditures (which encourage specific behav-
ior), he focuses on what this Article calls "programmatic incentives." In contrast, this Arti-
cle argues that both of these issues are relevant for all tax expenditures, as is excess
burden, which Polsky does not discuss. His brief article also does not evaluate specific
types of limits and the trade-offs they involve. Gregg D. Polsky, Rationally Cutting Tax
Expenditures, 50 U. Louisville L. Rev. 643 (2012).
45 Id. at 644 (focusing on fairness for what Polsky calls "distributional" tax
expenditures).
46 See Galle, note 27, at 61-65; Jacob Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience,
16 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 144, 144-49 (2014); Schenk, note 27, at 256-60.
47 See Batchelder et al., note 10, at 24-25.
48 Cf. Fleischer, note 29.
49 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford, Alternatives to Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory
Decisions, 363 Annals N.Y. Acad. Sci. 129 (1981); William Ecinosa, The Economics of
Regulatory Mandates on the HMO Market, 20 J. Health Econ. 85 (2001); Michael Herz,
Environmental Auditing and Environmental Management: The Implicit and Explicit Fed-
eral Regulatory Mandate, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1241 (1991).
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align. It also shows how context-specific tailoring is needed to balance
trade-offs, and takes issue with Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag's
view50 that tax expenditures usually should offer the same reimburse-
ment rate at all income levels. Part VI is the conclusion.
II. REVENUE, POLITICS, AND A PROLIFERATION
OF ONE-SIZE-FITS-ALL PROPOSALS
A. A Potentially Significant Source of Revenue
Repealing or limiting tax expenditures can raise a great deal of rev-
enue. The federal government committed $1.2 trillion to tax expendi-
tures in Fiscal Year 2014,51 compared with $3.5 trillion of direct
spending and $3.02 trillion of taxes collected. 52 Adjusted for inflation,
tax expenditures have nearly doubled since 1991. 53 The largest tax
expenditure, the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance,
was estimated at $143 billion in 2014. 54 This is more than the 2014
federal budget allocated to the Departments of Homeland Security
($39 billion), Education ($71.2 billion), and Justice ($16.3 billion)
combined. 55 Likewise, the three largest tax expenditures supporting
home ownership were estimated at $123.8 billion in 2014 ($67.8 billion
for home mortgage interest, $31.9 billion for property taxes, and $24.1
billion for profits from the sale of a personal residence).5 6 This rough
estimate suggests that health insurance and homeownership together
($267.5 billion) cost more than the interest on the national debt ($231
billion). 57 Like direct expenditures, tax expenditures support a broad
50 See Batchelder et al., note 10, at 24-25.
51 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 113th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2014-18 (Comm. Print 2014), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications
.html?func=startdown&id=4663; This sum is only a rough estimate, since tax expenditure
estimates do not account for behavioral or interaction effects of repeal or limits. See gen-
erally Rosanne Altshuler & Robert Dietz, Reconsidering Tax Expenditure Estimation, 64
Nat'l Tax J. 459, 486 (2011) ("[T]ax expenditures cannot be summed to determine the
revenue consequences of eliminating sets of preferences due to interaction effects.").
52 See Jonathan House, Budget Deficit Returns to Precession Levels, Wall St. J., Oct. 15,
2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-budget-deficit-in-2014-narrows-to-lowest-level-in-six-
years-1413385493.
53 McBride, note 1, at 1 (representing 96% growth since 1991).
54 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 31.
55 Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget of the U.S. Government 222
(2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=
BUDGET&browTath=Fiscal+Year+2014&searchPath=Fiscal+Year+2014&leafLevel
Browse=false&isCollapsed=false&isOpen=true&packageid=BUDGET-2014-BUD&ycord
=-2.
56 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 25-26.
57 See Wendy Edelberg, Cong. Budget Office, CBO's Projection of Federal Interest Pay-
ments (Sept. 3, 2014), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/45684.
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range of activities, including charity ($46.9 billion),58 research and de-
velopment ($10.2 billion), 59 green energy ($3.8 billion), 60 earned in-
come ($69.2 billion), 61 retirement savings ($132 billion),62 and
education ($33.6 billion). 63
B. Politics and the Proliferation of One-Size-Fits-All Proposals
Since so much money is at stake, it is not surprising that nonpartisan
commissions, politicians on both sides of the aisle, and leading aca-
demics have proposed to scale back tax expenditures in various ways.
Yet advancing this agenda is not easy, since tax expenditures have
deep political roots. They offer concentrated benefits to organized in-
terest groups, and are subject to less scrutiny than spending programs
under congressional rules.64 Tax expenditures also allow taxpayers to
keep money they already have, drawing strength from a cognitive bias
known as the endowment effect. 65
Even so, limiting tax expenditures has four political advantages
over other ways to cut the deficit. First, for some voters, limits are less
salient than rate increases. 66 Like the alternative minimum tax, their
effects can be hard to discern, particularly for less-sophisticated tax-
payers. 67 Second, this is especially true when politicians promise to
58 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 29, 31 (showing $46.9 billion in total, with $4.8
billion for health, $6.3 billion for education, and $35.8 billion for other charity).
59 See Appendix.
60 Id.
61 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 32.
62 See Appendix.
63 Id. The Appendix offers more detail about these and other examples. Of over 200 tax
expenditures identified by JCT in 2014, the top five were: exclusion of health insurance,
exclusion of pensions, preferential treatment of dividends and capital gains, state and local
taxes, and mortgage interest. Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 22-33.
64 Edward D. Kleinbard, Tax Expenditure Framework Legislation, 63 Nat'l Tax J. 353,
366-68 (2010).
65 Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 Tax L. Rev.
187, 220 (2004) ("A deeper cause [of the appeal of tax expenditures] is the heuristic bias
that decision researchers call the endowment effect, under which people systematically
under-weight opportunity costs relative to equivalent out-of-pocket costs."); David A.
Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 Yale L.J.
955, 970 (2004) ("They may perceive a tax subsidy as merely letting them keep their
money, even while they perceive an identical program that taxes them and gives the money
back through programs or services to be a subsidy.").
66 See Schenk, note 27, at 255 (arguing that in a "political landscape [where] there is a
looming fiscal crisis but intense tax aversion and [where] the politics of taxation make
raising additional revenue extremely difficult, Congress [should] use low salience provi-
sions that make taxation more palatable.").
67 As other examples, Schenk mentions the Pease rule, limits on personal exemptions
and, more generally, limits on tax expenditures. Id. at 276-77 ("For example, interaction
between various provisions may obscure their effects. For example, the top nominal margi-
nal tax rate is quite salient but often does not apply because other provisions, such as
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impose limits, but do not specify which tax expenditures they will tar-
get.68 While they eventually have to fill in specifics, the proposal can
gain momentum before then. Third, scaling back tax expenditures can
be characterized as either a tax increase or a spending cut.69 This hy-
brid quality gives some "cover" to both political parties. Republicans
who pledged not to raise taxes can say they kept their promise, as can
Democrats who promised not to cut social programs.70 Fourth, poli-
cies that make the overall economic pie grow can attract a political
following. Constituents who expect to reap these welfare gains can
become political allies. The same is true of interest groups who do not
currently benefit from a tax expenditure, and thus would not be ad-
versely affected by a limit. Instead of being indifferent, they will af-
firmatively support this limit if they expect to bear the cost of an
alternative response to the deficit, such as higher marginal rates,
spending cuts, or deficit spending.71
Yet, although there is growing political interest in scaling back tax
expenditures, a common problem is that proposals often treat all (or
almost all) tax expenditures the same way. A prominent example is
the 2010 Bowles-Simpson Commission that "relies on 'zero-base
budgeting' by eliminating all income tax expenditures . . . and then
using the revenue to lower rates and reduce deficits."' 72 Commenta-
income ceilings, rate-bubbles, and phase-outs, have the effect of increasing the rate."); see
Manning & Andress, note 42, at 1614 ("[T]he overall limitation on itemized deductions
[was] probably deliberately designed to obscure their effect on the [rate] structure and
particularly their creation of higher brackets at lower amounts of income.").
68 Leonard E. Burman & Marvin Phaup, Tax Expenditures, the Size and Efficiency of
Government, and Implications for Budget Reform, in 26 Tax Policy and the Economy, note
32, at 113.
69 Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1998 Duke L.J. 1155, 1162,
1178.
70 Admittedly, this is the opposite of the traditional view about the bipartisan appeal of
tax expenditures articulated by Gene Steuerle and others, but the political dynamic seems
to be changing. Eugene Steuerle, Tax Policy from 1990 to 2001, in American Economic
Policy in the 1990s, at 139, 154 (Jeffrey A. Frankel & Peter R. Orszag eds., 2002)
("'[C]onservatives' still hold a belief that tax expenditures are reductions in tax and ways
of giving money back to people, even while 'liberals' have come to realize that they can
achieve certain social objectives more easily if enacted as a tax cut."); see Eric J. Toder, Tax
Cuts or Spending-Does it Make a Difference?, 53 Nat'l Tax J. 361, 361 ("Tax incentives
serve the needs of political leaders by enabling them to appear to reduce spending and
taxes, while at the same time pursuing an activist policy that promotes popular
programs.").
71 Cf. Siona Listokin, Yair Listokin & Samson Mesel, Americans' Preferences for Tax
Increases and Spending Cuts, 139 Tax Notes 188, 190 (Apr. 8, 2012) (finding that 58% of
survey respondents supported repeal of state and local tax deduction, while 53% supported
repeal of home mortgage interest deduction; in contrast, 84% supported tax increases on
"at least some" (unspecified) Americans, while 66% supported cuts in (unspecified)
nondefense spending, and 64% supported cuts in (unspecified) defense programs).
72 Nat'l Comm'n on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, note 7, at 29. In addition to this
"zero option," the commission also offers alternative proposals that retain but scale back a
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tors and politicians routinely praise the Bowles-Simpson report,73 and
rarely focus on its reliance on a uniform approach.
Likewise, both presidential candidates in 2012 proposed uniform
approaches to scaling back tax expenditures. President Obama sought
to limit the value of a broad range of tax expenditures to 28%. His
proposal applied to all itemized deductions as well as a number of
exclusions.74 Meanwhile, Governor Romney suggested an overall cap
on itemized deductions. He originally proposed a $17,000 cap and
then increased it to $25,000. 75 This cap applied to a basket of tax ex-
penditures, although the proposal did not specify which were
included. 76
Similarly, the United Kingdom introduced an overall cap on "tax
reliefs" in 2012, limiting them to the greater of £50,000 or 25% of
income. The stated rationale was "to help ensure that those with the
highest incomes pay a fairer share." 77 Commentators have urged
other jurisdictions to follow this model.78
There are obvious political advantages to proposals that apply uni-
formly to all tax expenditures. They spread the pain more broadly.
Each interest group has less reason to resist if it is footing only a frac-
tion of the bill. Congress also can say that "we are all in this to-
gether," casting interest groups that seek special treatment in a less
few tax expenditures (for example, offering a limited 12% credit for mortgage interest and
charity). Id. at 31.
73 See, e.g., Steven I. Platt, Bring Back Simpson and Bowles, Idaho Bus. Rev., Dec. 3,
2012, http://idahobusinessreview.com/2012/12/03/bring-back-simpson-and-bowles/#ixzz3lgS
Jxv6B ("Both Simpson and Bowles enjoy the almost universal respect and admiration not
only of the other members of the commission, but also of the president and the leadership
of both sides and parties in Congress."); Darrell M. West & Ashley Gabriele, Brookings
Inst., Ten Leadership Lessons from Simpson-Bowles (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.brookings
.edu/research/papers/2012/11/14-simpson-bowles-west (distilling a number of "fiscal leader-
ship lessons" from Bowles-Simpson).
74 U.S. Treasury Dep't, General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2013
Revenue Proposals 74 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-pol-
icy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf (proposing to limit "exclusions and de-
ductions [for] any tax-exempt state and local bond interest, employer-sponsored health
insurance paid for by employers or with before-tax employee dollars, health insurance
costs of self-employed individuals, employee contributions to defined contribution retire-
ment plans and individual retirement arrangements, the deduction for income attributable
to domestic production activities, certain trade and business deductions of employees,
moving expenses, contributions to health savings accounts and Archer MSAs, interest on
education loans, and certain higher education expenses.... after they have been reduced
by the statutory limitation on certain itemized deductions for higher income taxpayers").
75 Entin, note 21.
76 Id.
77 HM Treasury, Budget 2012, at 33 (2012), available at http://webarchive.nationalarch
ives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.ukbudget2l2-complete.pdf.
78 See, e.g., Warren, note 10, at 359.
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flattering light.79 It may also be harder for interest groups-or at least
for average voters-to predict a limit's effects when it applies to a
basket of tax expenditures, instead of a single one. Likewise, defend-
ers of a global limit can say (somewhat disingenuously) that they are
not targeting any specific tax expenditure, but are merely making sure
that taxpayers do not use too many or lower their tax bill too much. 0
Yet in addition to politicians, leading academics also have advo-
cated uniform treatment of tax expenditures. Governor Romney's
cap originally came from Martin Feldstein, although Feldstein's pro-
posal uses a percentage of income to define the cap (2% of AGI),
instead of a dollar amount ($17,000 or $25,000). Also, instead of cap-
ping the amount that can be deducted or excluded, as Romney does,
Feldstein caps the tax benefit that can be claimed; under Feldstein's
proposal, then, someone in a higher bracket (who derives more tax
benefit per dollar) can claim fewer dollars of deductions and exclu-
sions. Feldstein's basket cap covers a very broad range of tax expend-
itures. Earlier versions apply to all itemized deductions, the exclusion
for employer-provided health insurance, as well as some credits,81
while later versions exclude the charitable deduction.82
Likewise, Edward Kleinbard advocates recasting all personal item-
ized deductions as 15% credits. "The reason to curb all the personal
itemized deductions," he argues, "is that it is impossible to choose
among them. Each can be defended as an incentive for one desirable
goal or another. '8 3 Echoing this theme, Neil Warren advocates "the
UK approach where the focus is on global caps rather than imposing
specific caps on a myriad of individual itemized deductions. 8s4
Similarly, tax expenditures are treated uniformly in a prominent
proposal by Lily Batchelder, Fred Goldberg, and Peter Orszag.85
Their focus is not on how to limit tax expenditures, but how to struc-
79 See Walter J. Blum, Federal Income Tax Reform-Twenty Questions, 41 Taxes 672,
679 (1963) ("[T]he existence of any one special dispensation makes it easier to argue on
behalf of others.... [A] Spartan attitude toward defending the integrity of the base will aid
in creating the impression that the reform plan is intended to improve the system as a
whole, with the chips falling as they may, and is not calculated to benefit certain identifi-
able groups possessing political strength."); Martin Feldstein, A Simple Route to Major
Deficit Reduction, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 2013, at H15, ("The 2% overall cap on tax expendi-
tures should be politically more acceptable than changes in the treatment of mortgage
interest or other specific deductions because it treats all tax expenditures equally.").
8o See Warren, note 10, at 376 (arguing that global caps "elicit far less strident criticism
as they do not target one particular group but all taxpayers whose total deductions increase
with increasing income").
81 See Feldstein et al., note 8, at 505-07.
82 See Feldstein, note 79, at H15 ("The existing charitable deduction in particular de-
serves to be maintained.")
83 Kleinbard, note 9, at 382.
84 Warren, note 10, at 359.
85 Batchelder et al., note 10, at 24-25.
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ture them. They want each tax expenditure to be a refundable credit
(so that it is available even to those who would not otherwise owe
tax), instead of a deduction or exclusion. 86 This way, all taxpayers
receive the same marginal reimbursement rate, whether they have low
or high incomes. To be clear, their goal is uniformity among taxpay-
ers, not among tax expenditures (so they are not arguing that all tax
expenditures should have the same marginal reimbursement rate).
Rather, they offer an efficiency-based argument that uniform treat-
ment of all taxpayers should be the default.
III. THREE-PART FRAMEWORK: PROGRAMMATIC BENEFITS,
EXCESS BURDEN, AND DISTRIBUTION
Notwithstanding their political advantages, one-size-fits-all ap-
proaches are not good policy. Rather, in deciding whether to scale
back a tax expenditure, we should use context-specific cost-benefit
analysis. As Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki have shown, we
should consider how welfare costs and benefits change at the
margin.8 7
A. A Context-Specific Framework
This Section offers a three-part framework for these judgments. I
begin with the programmatic benefits we lose if the tax expenditure is
scaled back. For example, if the exclusion for employer-provided
health insurance is scaled back, will people be less healthy? Likewise,
if a tax expenditure has negative effects, repealing or limiting it could
reduce these programmatic costs. The balance is different for each tax
expenditure. The next Section explores these issues.
Second, how does scaling back a tax expenditure affect excess bur-
den?8 For tax expenditures that create significant deadweight loss,
repeal or a limit is especially appealing. Yet if repeal or the limit itself
creates deadweight loss, the case becomes weaker. Again, there is no
one-size-fits all answer. Section II.C considers these questions.
A third important factor is distribution. If a tax expenditure partic-
ularly benefits low-income taxpayers, scaling it back is less appealing.
Likewise, we should be more wary of administrative and program-
matic costs that burden these taxpayers. How much we favor low-
86 Id.
87 See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 31, at 189.
88 Models in this literature typically use optimal taxation, supplemented by commodity
taxes that pursue redistribution or correct for externalities. See, e.g., Pirttila & Schob, note
31, at 554 ("[T]he modified many-person Ramsey tax rule reveals that the influence of
commodity taxation on the demand for taxed goods depends on both redistributional and
environmental objectives."); Sandmo, note 31, at 86.
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income taxpayers depends on our social welfare function. Whether a
limit disproportionately affects low-income taxpayers depends on the
context. For example, the EITC and mortgage interest deduction
have different distributional impact, so limiting them in the same way
would have different welfare effects. 89 Section II.D analyzes these
issues.
This framework focuses on what is lost in repealing or limiting a tax
expenditure. The offsetting benefit, of course, is that the government
saves money. To know how much this savings enhances welfare, we
need to know how it will be used.90 Will we cut taxes? Will we avoid
raising them? Will we cut the deficit? Or fund a new initiative? The
case for repeal or limits is stronger if we use the savings wisely.91 But
this is a separate issue, which is beyond this Article's scope. Before
we determine the best way to use savings, we first need to generate
it-ideally, at the lowest possible (welfare) cost.
Although the rest of this Part discusses programmatic benefits, ex-
cess burden, and distribution separately, analyzing only one without
the others does not yield a conclusive assessment. While examples are
offered at various points to clarify the analysis, they are merely illus-
trative, and are not meant as definitive recommendations. Such a
thorough analysis would require fact-specific inquiries that are beyond
this Article's scope. Instead, the goal here is to clarify the relevant
89 As Louis Kaplow has shown, excess burden and distribution need not be considered if
the government can tell what benefit each individual derives from a program and charges
each taxpayer this amount. This benefits tax involves no redistribution or behavioral dis-
tortions, since people are simply paying for value. Kaplow, Optimal Supply, note 31, at 514
(explaining that, when "any reduction in disposable income due to the tax adjustment is
balanced by the benefit from the public good," work effort and utility level are unaffected
and "the simple cost-benefit formula indicates whether the public good should be sup-
plied"); Kaplow, Optimal Control, note 31, at 487-89 (formalizing this result). But if the
program is financed with a tax that involves redistribution and behavioral distortions, as is
generally the case, these additional factors must be considered.
90 Indeed, it could be that the same limit is cost-justified if the savings is used one way,
but not another. See, e.g., Michael Schuyler, Tax Found., The Effect of Terminating Tax
Expenditures and Cutting Individual Tax Rates (Sept. 30, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/
article/effects-terminating-tax-expenditures-and-cutting-individua-income-tax-rates (using
Tax Foundation's taxes and growth model to simulate effects of cutting various tax expend-
itures with and without rate cuts; simulations suggest that rate cuts are needed to counter-
act potentially significant adverse effects on growth); cf. Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note 31, at
189 (noting that when tax and transfer policy is not set optimally, decision about whether
to add a new government program depends on how it will be funded; answer can change if
one funding source is used instead of another).
91 Of course, if tax and spending policies were optimal, then this would not be the case.
As Slemrod and Yitzhaki have observed, the marginal benefit from all public projects and
the marginal cost of public funds would all be the same. Otherwise, we would replace low-
benefit projects with higher-benefit ones, and we would replace higher-cost funding
sources with lower-cost ones, until all were equal at the margin. Slemrod & Yitzhaki, note
31, at 191-96. Yet only the staunchest optimist would suggest that current tax and spending
policies are anything close to optimal.
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questions, identify trade-offs and patterns, and develop more general
lessons.
B. What Programmatic Benefits Would Be Lost in Repealing
or Limiting a Tax Expenditure?
This Section considers the programmatic benefits that would be lost
when scaling back a tax expenditure. We want to keep as much of the
benefit as possible, even as we cut costs. The goal, then, is to extract
more programmatic benefits per subsidy dollar-that is, more "bang
for the buck."
1. Externalities, Private Benefits, and Incidence
The priority should be to preserve positive externalities (as opposed
to private benefits), since otherwise these benefits to third parties
would be undersupplied. At the margin, a subsidy usually should
equal the marginal positive externalities it creates (net of any margi-
nal negative externalities). 92 By contrast, the market usually provides
private benefits without a subsidy. For example, we do not need to
subsidize mortgage interest to ensure that wealthy people live in
houses they like. However, some private benefits are worth subsi-
dizing for distributional reasons. An important justification for the
EITC, for instance, is the private benefits it offers to low-income
taxpayers.
In assessing the value of externalities and private benefits, we need
to account for economic incidence. For example, if the EITC enables
employers to reduce wages, the real beneficiary is the employer in-
stead of the employee. Likewise, a subsidy for health insurance might
drive up the cost of care, benefiting health care providers more than
policyholders. Obviously, we need to know who is really benefitting
in order to determine the value of a subsidy.
2. Three Possibilities: Repeal, Status Quo, or Tightening Strategies
A tax expenditure (or, indeed, any government program) that is
counterproductive obviously is a promising candidate for repeal. For
instance, cigarette companies used to argue that cigarettes-or at least
92 Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to
Government Policy, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2004, at 159-64 (advocating the idea that optimal
subsidy equates marginal social benefit of activity with marginal social cost). It also can be
lower if these externalities correlate with leisure, and higher if they correlate with another
(unsubsidized) externality. This is equivalent to offsetting the subsidy with a commodity
tax. Kaplow, Optimal Control, note 31, at 497, 501, 505; Kaplow, Optimal Supply, note 31,
at 518; Saez, note 31, at 2675-80.
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some brands-were good for a smoker's health. 93 If a subsidy had
been enacted to encourage better health through smoking, the right
response obviously would be to repeal it.
The same is true of a tax expenditure that offers only meager
programmatic benefits. For example, if a tax expenditure enables the
government to endorse a particular activity, but fails to induce more
of it, the government should look for cheaper ways to make a sym-
bolic statement.
In contrast, it is costly to scale back a tax expenditure that produces
substantial positive externalities. For instance, accelerated deprecia-
tion and other investment incentives arguably promote economic
growth more effectively than marginal rate cuts (and, in fact, would
not be classified as "tax expenditures" under a consumption tax base-
line). 94 Robust programmatic benefits can supply a powerful reason
to keep a tax expenditure, although we also should account for excess
burden and distribution.
Yet even if a tax expenditure (or any government program) is worth
preserving, we should try to attain all (or most) of its programmatic
benefits at lower budgetary cost. The rest of this Part identifies five
ways to do so: (1) defining the funded activity more precisely; (2)
identifying more responsive claimants; (3) favoring claimants who will
make more effective use of the subsidy; (4) calibrating how much ac-
tivity we should fund, both for each claimant and overall; and (5)
housing the program in a part of the government that can implement
it most effectively. In choosing a strategy, we have to account for the
factual context, as well as excess burden and distribution. What works
for one tax expenditure may not work for another.
93 See, e.g., Leah Lawrence, Cigarettes Were Once "Physician" Tested, Approved,
Healio/HemOnc Today, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.healio.com/hematology-oncology/news/
print/hemonc-today/%7B241d62a7-fe6e-4c5b-9fed-a33cc6e4bd7c%7D/cigarettes-were-
once-physician-tested-approved.
94 For example, a widely cited study claims that repealing accelerated depreciation and
other investment incentives to fund reductions in the corporate tax rate would slow
growth. See John W. Diamond, George R. Zodrow, Thomas S. Neubig & Robert J. Car-
roll, The Dynamic Economic Effects of a U.S. Corporate Income Tax Rate Reduction 17-
18 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Tax'n, Working Paper No. 14/05, 2014), available at http://
www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business-Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working-Papers/
series-14/WP1405.pdf. Other studies conclude that repealing individual tax expenditures
that favor savings and investment would significantly reduce savings and investment; the
effect is especially pronounced if repeal is not accompanied by an across-the-board rate
cut, but remains even if it is. See, e.g., Schuyler, note 90, at 5.
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3. Which Activity Do We Want to Encourage?:
Definitional Strategies
A familiar way to "tighten up" a tax expenditure is to define the
funded activity more precisely. A clearer and more focused signal
presumably is more likely to motivate the behavior we want. There is
value, then, in explicitly excluding low-value activities. For example,
education credits exclude "education involving sports, games, or hob-
bies" as well as nonacademic fees.95 The reason presumably is that
these expenses add less to human capital than academic tuition, and
also are not easy to distinguish from leisure. 96
Yet precision is helpful only if it actually distinguishes high- and
low-value activities, and this is not always the case. For example, de-
tailed rules specify what qualifies as a deductible medical expense, but
the answers sometimes seem arbitrary: Removing lead paint is de-
ductible, but covering it with wallpaper is not; breast pumps are de-
ductible, while maternity clothes are not, and so on. 97
Precise definitions also can be costly to formulate and administer.
Sometimes these costs are justified, but sometimes they are not. For
example, the charitable deduction arguably should cover for-profit
charity, as well as gifts to family and friends, since these activities can
generate positive externalities. Yet a key problem with subsidizing
them, as Kaplow has observed, is the challenge of distinguishing them
from standard commercial arrangements. 98
In some cases, the government does not have the substantive exper-
tise or political independence to develop precise funding parameters.
For these reasons, the research and development credit is imprecise by
design. The government is not well positioned to determine which
technologies are most promising. Instead, the R&D credit uses ex-
pansive criteria, such as requiring projects to be "technological in na-
ture," and "useful in the development of a new or improved business
95 IRC § 25A(f).
96 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 113th Cong., Background and Present Law
Related to Tax Benefits for Education 7 (Comm. Print 2014), available at https://www.jct
.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4621 (noting these expenses are deductible
only if undertaken to improve jobs skills).
97 See generally IRS Pub. 502, Medical and Dental Expenses 5-17 (2014), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf.
98 Kaplow, note 36, at 475 ("Of course, any rationale for subsidizing gifts assumes that,
as a practical matter, they can be distinguished from payments for goods or services. But
the presence of return flows from beneficiaries to donors (which could even include re-
turning the gift itself) would often be difficult to detect, particularly for gifts within the
family. This administrative constraint may be more of a problem with respect to private
giving than contributions to public charities.").
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component." 99 The charitable deduction is similarly broad and
vague.1'0
Its nondirective approach promotes experimentation, enabling the
government to fund causes that would not (yet) be supported by the
median voter. As a result, the civil rights movement, environmental-
ism, and the women's rights movement all were launched with deduct-
ible charitable contributions. 101 At the same time, a nondirective
approach also creates the risk that undeserving activities will be
funded. The optimal balance between promoting experimentation
and reducing waste will vary for each tax expenditure, and excess bur-
den and distribution must also be considered. Again, there is no one-
size-fits-all answer.
4. Which Claimants Are Easiest to Motivate?: Elasticity Strategies
Once the favored conduct has been defined, a key question is how
much the government must pay to induce more of it. Obviously, less
is better. Another familiar strategy, then, is to favor claimants who
are relatively open to the favored conduct, and thus respond to a
leaner subsidy. 10 2 "By targeting the subsidy to those whose tastes for
the favored commodity are relatively intense," Alan Blinder and Har-
vey Rosen have observed, a subsidy "does not 'waste' money on those
whose consumption is not stimulated very much. 10 3
The amount needed to change behavior will vary with the person, as
well as the tax expenditure. Sometimes tastes and philosophical com-
mitments are relevant. For instance, it probably is easier to persuade
a committed environmentalist to buy solar panels.
Typically, high-income taxpayers are easier to influence, since they
have more capacity in their budgets. For example, if we want some-
99 IRC § 41(d).
100 See IRC § 170(c).
101 Schizer, note 36, at 244.
102 See Batchelder, et al., note 10, at 46; Kaplow, Optimal Supply, note 31, at 518; Saez,
note 31, at 2659 ("First and obviously, the size of the subsidy is closely related to the size of
the external effect .... Second, the optimal subsidy is positively related to the price elastic-
ity of the contribution good."); Sandmo, note 31, at 93, 97 ("[E]ven in a world of distortio-
nary taxation where the allocative functions of the price system cannot be separated from
its effects on distribution, there is scope for taxing externality-generating commodities ac-
cording to the Pigouvian principle" and "the optimal tax rate for the externality-creating
commodity is a weighted average of the inverse elasticity and the marginal social dam-
age"). In general, this Article focuses on uncompensated elasticity, so I do not assume that
income is adjusted to eliminate any income effects.
103 Alan S. Blinder & Harvey S. Rosen, Notches, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 736, 741-42 (1985)
(analyzing "notch" strategies that vary subsidy with consumption levels, including floor on
charitable deduction; arguing that "reasonable notch schemes make smaller demands on
the treasury ... but often have larger excess burdens" and that this trade-off can be worth-
while because "real world tax finance creates its own efficiency costs.").
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one to commit $25,000 to solar panels or a fuel-efficient car, a poten-
tial claimant earning $2.5 million is easier to persuade than one
earning $50,000. In response, we can structure the subsidy so it de-
clines with income, or we can set it at the (leaner) level that is appro-
priate for high-income claimants. Likewise, limiting the subsidy to
itemizers tends to channel it to high-income claimants. Of course, dis-
tribution or excess burden sometimes counsels against this approach,
and should be weighted in the balance.
Although claimants should be responsive, they should not be too
responsive. We should not pay for what taxpayers would do any-
way. 104 For example, subsidizing the first dollar of charity is wasteful
if everyone would give this amount without a subsidy. 0 5 In response,
we can disallow charitable contributions below a floor. In other work,
I have suggested a charitable credit that becomes more generous as
taxpayers give a higher percentage of their income to charity.'0 6 Like-
wise, President Bush's 2005 tax reform panel proposed to subsidize
charity only above 1% of income.10 7 Yet a familiar challenge is that
preferences vary. For example, although many Americans give at
least 1% of their income to charity-and some receive no subsidy,
since they claim the standard deduction-a 1% floor would still be too
high for some and too low for others.'08 Some will stop giving, some
104 Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 719 (1970)
("It is generally argued that tax incentives are wasteful because some of the tax benefits go
to taxpayers for activities which they would have performed without the benefits."); Ed-
ward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64
Tex. L. Rev. 973, 992 (1986) ("To the extent a tax incentive rewards a producer for produc-
tion in which he would have engaged anyway, or reimburses a consumer for consumption
he would have undertaken in any event, the government has acted inefficiently by giving
up revenue without inducing more activity.").
105 See Ackerman & Auten, note 14, at 523; Joel Slemrod, Buenas Notches: Lines and
Notches in Tax System Design 18 (2010), available at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/
jslemrod/pdf/Buenas%20Notches%20090210.pdf ("[C]ompared to a constant per-unit sub-
sidy that applies to all charitable donations, a notch grant that kicks in only for those
whose consumption exceeds a certain amount limits the amount of subsidy for in-
framarginal giving. In principle, when revenue is costly to raise, the ideal subsidy scheme
would provide a subsidy only at the margin of favored consumption but, in the absence of
personalized incentive schemes or other non-linear consumption taxes or subsidies, a notch
may increase welfare.").
106 Schizer, note 36, at 268.
107 Report of the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, Simple, Fair and Pro-
Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System 75 (2005), available at http://www.trea-
sury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Simple-Fair-and-Pro-Growth-Proposals-to-
Fix-Americas-Tax-System-11-2005.pdf [hereinafter Bush Panel] ("The Panel recommends
that all taxpayers be entitled to deduct charitable contributions exceeding 1 percent of
income. This level is based on the observation that most taxpayers already contribute
more than 1 percent of their income to charity.").
108 A 1% floor may be too high at the top. According to Ackerman and Auten, the
median itemizer (in 2003) gave 2.3% of economic income, those earning between $500,000
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will receive an inframarginal subsidy, and some will reduce their con-
tribution to offset the subsidy they lost through the floor. 109 These
competing effects should all be considered in deciding whether, and
where, to set a floor (along with excess burden and distribution).
5. Which Claimants Will Make Most Effective Use of the Subsidy?:
Comparative-Advantage Strategies
A third approach is to favor claimants who make the most effective
use of a subsidy. In some circumstances, claimants are fungible. For
instance, assume we want to subsidize carpooling to reduce negative
externalities from traffic, such as delays, noise, and accidents. We are
unlikely to care which commuters claim this subsidy, as long as
enough do.
In contrast, factors such as expertise, infrastructure, geography, or
even weather sometimes give claimants a comparative advantage. For
example, if our goal is to encourage technological innovation, engi-
neers have an edge over literary critics and musicians. Similarly, some
charitable donors make wiser philanthropic decisions than others. Al-
ternatively, assume our goal is to reduce fuel consumption as a way to
enhance national security (by reducing imports from unstable or hos-
tile countries). If we subsidize mass transit, residents of Manhattan
(which has extensive mass transit) can use the subsidy more effec-
tively than residents of rural Kansas (which does not). Likewise, sub-
sidizing weather stripping to conserve fuel in heating homes is more
effective in frigid Chicago than in mild Los Angeles.
For some tax expenditures, financial need is a source of compara-
tive advantage. Private benefits to low-income claimants add more to
welfare, given diminishing marginal utility. In addition to distribution,
there also is an externalities-based reason. If a community is commit-
ted to supporting anyone who is not self-sufficient, the community
saves money when people become self-sufficient. Someone who en-
ters the workforce no longer relies on the community for support.
and $1 million gave 1.4%, and those earning over $1 million gave 1.1%. Ackerman &
Auten, note 14, at 515 tbl.1. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data for
nonitemizers shows a 1.36% median for nonitemizers. Id. at 516 tbl.2. Fifty-eight percent
of families that made charitable contributions gave more than 1%. Id. at 517.
109 For example, assume that someone subject to a 50% rate has been giving 3% of her
income to charity; if we add a 1% floor, she can preserve the same after-tax cost by reduc-
ing her giving to 2%. Without the floor, a 3% contribution costs 1.5% (that is, 50% of
3%). With a 1% floor, a 2% contribution also costs 1.5% (that is, 1% plus 50% of 1%).
See id. at 513 (discussing net altruism); Martin Feldstein & Lawrence Lindsey, Simulating
Nonlinear Tax Rules and Nonstandard Behavior: An Application to the Tax Treatment of
Charitable Contributions, in Behavioral Simulation Methods in Tax Policy Analysis 139,
151-52 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1983) (same).
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The same is true when he funds his own health care, housing, and
retirement savings. By inducing people to take these steps, a subsidy
can generate what this Article calls positive "self-sufficiency externali-
ties." Low-income claimants are especially likely to generate these
externalities, since they are at greater risk of depending on the
community." 0
In promoting self-sufficiency externalities, we target those who (by
definition) would not otherwise engage in the favored conduct (for
example, working or saving for retirement). If we are successful, the
good news is that we are less likely to pay for what claimants would do
anyway. The other side of this coin, though, is that these claimants are
(by definition) resistant, rather than responsive. As a result, they are
harder (and more expensive) to motivate. For these subsidies, greater
welfare gains come at greater cost.
But fortunately, this trade-off between comparative advantage and
elasticity does not always arise. In other contexts, taxpayers who
make the most effective use of a subsidy are also the most responsive.
For example, the same reason Chicagoans use weather stripping more
effectively than Angelinos-the cold weather-also makes them want
it more. As a result, Chicagoans require less persuasion to buy it. The
same is true of mass transit subsidies. Since Manhattan residents actu-
ally can use this subsidy, they will be more responsive. Likewise, it
will be easier to persuade an engineer than a literary critic to engage
in R&D. Since claimants would have to invest time and resources,
they are more likely to do so if they expect a return.
Thus, while we have a uniform goal with each subsidy-to favor
claimants who generate the most welfare per subsidy dollar-we
should pursue this goal differently for each tax expenditure. If a
claimant's comparative advantage derives from financial need, an in-
come-based test may be the right mechanism. Yet if comparative ad-
vantage is rooted instead in a claimant's effectiveness in engaging in
the favored conduct-given their preferences, location, expertise, and
the like-other approaches will be preferable. In some cases, we
should sort claimants with a competitive process, as when developers
apply to state housing agencies for the low-income housing credit. In
110 Another option is simply to require the relevant behavior, or to penalize those who
do not engage in it. Yet even if we otherwise would be tempted to take this approach,
there are particular challenges with low-income citizens. Can we really require them to
spend money they do not have? Instead, we are likely to subsidize them. For instance,
although the Affordable Care Act penalizes those who do not buy health insurance, it also
subsidizes policies for low-income people. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I-II, 124 Stat. 119, 130-353 (2010) (creating the penalty at IRC
§ 1501, providing tax subsidies in Title I, and expanding Medicaid in Title II). Thus, the
analysis of subsidies here remains relevant.
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other cases, substantive conditions could be introduced, for instance,
so weather-stripping is subsidized only in cold climates. We also can
winnow with price. By keeping the subsidy low, the government allo-
cates it to taxpayers who are most willing to put up their own money,
such as researchers who are especially confident about R&D or phi-
lanthropists who are particularly committed to a cause. The right
strategy varies with the factual context and, of course, must also ac-
count for excess burden and distribution.
6. How Much Favored Activity Do We Want?
Activity-Level Strategies
In addition to defining the favored activity carefully and identifying
the right claimants, we also need to calibrate the amount of activity we
want to subsidize. Another tightening strategy, then, is to focus on
how much funded activity we want overall and, in some cases, how
much we want per claimant.
For any tax expenditure, there are likely to be diminishing returns
when we encourage more favored activity in the aggregate. Once we
have funded all the high-value projects (for example, solar panels in
sunny locations), the remaining low-value projects (cloudy locations)
offer less bang for the buck. In response, Congress can cap its overall
annual spending on a tax expenditure. Although common for direct
expenditures, a fixed appropriation is rare for tax expenditures. Con-
gress does use one, though, for the low-income housing credit.11'
a. Individually Based Tax Expenditures Versus Aggregate Tax
Expenditures
Marginal returns can vary not only with the overall activity level,
but also with the activity level of each claimant. These variations are
crucial for some tax expenditures, and minor for others. Distinguish-
ing these two types of tax expenditure is a contribution of this Article.
This difference affects the type of limit we should use.
Sometimes the activity level of each claimant is quite important.
For instance, assume our goal in subsidizing retirement savings is to
keep retirees from becoming a burden on the community. With this
goal, subsidizing someone who would otherwise need the community's
help (for instance, because he would save only $100 per year on his
own) generates more positive externalities than subsidizing someone
who would be self-sufficient anyway (for instance, because she would
111 IRC § 42(h)(3)(C) (establishing a cap on the low-income housing credit available to
each state).
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save $1 million each year without a subsidy). When we are promoting
self-sufficiency, then, marginal positive externalities decline as an indi-
vidual engages in more of the favored activity, since society does not
have to pitch in as much.
In contrast, sometimes only the aggregate activity level is relevant,
while the per-person level is not. In these cases, once we identify the
right pool of potential claimants, we can rely on a blunt allocation to
this group, without worrying about how much each individual claims.
Subsidized solar panels are an example. If the goal is to reduce green-
house gas emissions, we want panels to be installed in sunny locations.
But once we do that, it does not matter whether we subsidize one
panel on each house, or two on every other house. Either way, we are
replacing carbon-based energy. On a claimant-by-claimant basis, mar-
ginal positive externalities from solar panels do not decline in the
same way (although they can decline as activity levels rise in the
aggregate).
This Article uses the phrase "aggregate tax expenditure" to de-
scribe the solar panel example, as well as other tax expenditures
whose marginal programmatic benefits vary primarily with aggregate
activity levels. In contrast, this Article uses the phrase "individually-
based tax expenditure" to describe the retirement example, as well as
other tax expenditures whose marginal programmatic benefits also
vary substantially with individual activity levels.
Different limits are appropriate for these two categories. If our
goal is to encourage enough retirement savings so that people are self-
sufficient, we should cap the amount of each claimant's subsidized
savings. This sort of cap focuses the subsidy on high-value uses (that
is, the minimum needed for self-sufficiency). In contrast, setting a cap
of, say, one solar panel per claimant does not offer the same advan-
tage (although there could be other rationales for such a limit,
grounded in budgetary impact, excess burden, or distribution.)
b. Examples of Individually-Based Tax Expenditures
The defining feature of an individually-based tax expenditure, then,
is that programmatic benefits vary as individual activity levels change.
There are several reasons why this can be the case. The first is that
marginal positive externalities can decline. This is true of subsidies
that encourage self-sufficiency, such as subsidized retirement savings
and the EITC. After all, it makes sense to subsidize an extra dollar of
earnings when someone's annual pay is $10,000, but not $200,000.
(Obviously, there is a distributional rationale as well, as noted
2015]
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above.112) A similar analysis applies to education credits. If the goal
is to encourage the minimum human capital people need to support
themselves, marginal programmatic benefits decline in a similar way.
If so, per-claimant caps on these tax expenditures are likely to en-
hance their "bang for the buck" (although we also have to consider
excess burden and distribution).
Second, even if positive externalities remain constant (or increase)
as the subsidy becomes more generous, there can still be a net margi-
nal decline if programmatic costs increase (more). This is true of tax-
free fringe benefits. To avoid administrative costs, employees are not
taxed on occasional free meals, modest employee discounts, and the
like. 113 Yet this administrative savings comes at a price. Fringe bene-
fits distort compensation practices, since their tax treatment is more
favorable than cash. Because some industries can offer them more
easily than others, their labor costs are lower. These distortions be-
come more serious as fringe benefits become more valuable. As the
subsidy per claimant increases in this way, programmatic costs come
to outweigh the administrative savings. This shifting balance suggests
that tax-free treatment should be limited to low-value fringe benefits,
as generally is the case under current law.
The analysis is similar for subsidized health insurance. A subsidy
for basic policies is sufficient to generate most of the positive external-
ities we want, while a subsidy for "gold-plated" policies introduces
new problems. After all, basic policies keep people from depending
on the community for health care. They also broaden the insurance
pool, so risk is spread more effectively. In addition, basic policies or-
dinarily prevent people from infecting others and enable them to dis-
charge responsibilities to co-workers, family, other drivers on the
road, and the like. So what changes if we also subsidize "gold-plated"
policies? There could be more funding for medical research, which
generates positive externalities. Yet there also would be private bene-
fits, such as more convenient health care without long waits, which do
not justify a subsidy. In addition, we might encourage overspending
and drive up health care costs (for example, if deductibles and copay-
ments are lower), thereby generating negative externalities.1 14 It is
112 See Subsection III.B.1. Yair Listokin has argued that there also is a separate
macroeconomic effect. Since taxpayers are more likely to lose their jobs in a recession,
EITC payments are likely to decline, rendering this tax expenditure countercyclical. See
Listokin, note 43, at 62-85 (analyzing macroeconomic impact of a number of tax
expenditures).
113 See IRC § 132.
114 See Jonathan Gruber, The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance,
64 Nat'l Tax J. 511, 515 (2011); McBride, note 1, at 6 ("This tax bias contributes to over-
spending on health insurance and healthcare, ultimately raising prices rather than the qual-
ity of health care."); Andrew Pollack, Health Care Costs Climb Moderately, Survey Says,
[Vol. 68:
2015] LIMITING TAX EXPENDITURES
plausible, then, that increasing the subsidy per claimant causes margi-
nal programmatic benefits to decline on a net basis (for example, if
the effect on costs outweighs the effect on research). If so, a per-
claimant cap increases this tax expenditure's bang for the buck (al-
though, again, we also have to account for excess burden and
distribution).a15
Likewise, subsidized home ownership also involves increasing
programmatic costs. The purchase of a more expensive home can in-
spire envy or pressure others to spend more so they "keep up with the
Joneses. 1116 There are also negative externalities if homeowners are
less able to move for a new job, which could be more daunting with
more expensive houses. On the other side of the ledger, there are
positive externalities if homeowners are more committed than renters
to improving neighborhoods, and if a homeowner's investment en-
hances the value of her neighbors' homes.117 It seems plausible that
the balance of these competing effects becomes less favorable as the
subsidy per claimant increases. If so, an individually-based cap in-
creases the subsidy's bang for the buck (although excess burden and
distribution also must be considered).
Finally, although the focus so far has been on marginal program-
matic benefits that decline, they also can increase as a claimant en-
N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 2013, at B1 (indicating the average premium for a family in 2013 rose
by 4% to $16,351, according to Kaiser Family Foundation survey, which is a slower rate of
increase than the roughly 10% annual increases a decade earlier. Since 1999, premiums
have nearly tripled, while wages are up only 50% and consumer prices only 40%.).
115 The so-called "Cadillac tax" that takes effect in 2018-a 40% excise tax on health
insurance plans worth more than a minimum level ($10,200 for individuals and $27,500 for
families), see IRC § 4980(b)(3)(c)-has essentially the same effect as a direct limit on the
health insurance exclusion, but it collects the tax from insurance companies. Thus, employ-
ees will not see it on their Form W-2. In response, 17% of employers changed plans in
2013 in anticipation of the law. See Kyle Pomerleau, Tax Found., Obamacare's "Cadillac
Tax" Working as Planned (May 29, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/obamacares-cadil-
lac-tax-working-planned. The Bowles-Simpson Commission and the Bipartisan Policy
Center also proposed capping and then phasing out the exclusion. See Nat'l Comm'n on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, note 7, at 31; Bipartisan Comm'n Debt Reduction Task
Force, Restoring America's Future 16 (2010), available at http://concordcoalition.org/files/
RivlinCommissionExecSummary.pdf; see also Bush Panel, note 107, at 61 (limiting exclu-
sion to $11,500 for families and $5,000 for single individuals, which was average projected
for health insurance in 2006); Jonathan Cohn, Tax My Health Benefits. Please., New Re-
public (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/tax-my-health-benefits-
please.
116 See Robert H. Frank, Should Public Policy Respond to Externalities?, 92 J. Pub.
Econ. 1777, 1777 (2008).
117 See Zelinsky, note 104, at 998, 1007 (defending home mortgage deduction with "citi-
zenship externalities," the idea that home owners are "more responsible and stable mem-
bers of the community than tenants," the idea that renovations can raise the value of
neighbor's houses as well, and the need to offset other distortions that discourage invest-
ments in residential real estate, such as restrictive zoning, environmental laws, and trade
unions).
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gages in more favored activity. For example, if the goal is to create a
public park, it is more helpful for one person to donate a two-acre plot
than for twenty people to donate unconnected one-tenth-of-an-acre
plots. In addition, charitable donors who give large gifts have a
greater ability to monitor nonprofits, since they have added influence
and also more at stake. 118 When there are scale economies in generat-
ing positive externalities, caps can be counterproductive (although ex-
cess burden and distribution also must be taken into account).
Given these various context-specific effects, there is no reason to
expect the same limit to be a good fit for each tax expenditure. Yet
for individualized tax expenditures, if (net) externalities decline as
taxpayers engage in more activity, capping the amount each claimant
can claim can save money while preserving (most) programmatic
benefits.
c. Examples of Aggregate Tax Expenditures
The analysis is quite different, though, for tax expenditures that
seek to influence aggregate, rather than individual, activity levels.
Calibrating how much each claimant receives is less important (and,
indeed, can be unhelpful) in three situations. In the first, it does not
matter which claimant engages in the favored conduct, as long as
enough do. In the carpooling example above, a subsidy reduces nega-
tive externalities from traffic as long as a sufficient number of drivers
share rides, but we do not care which do. Congestion, noise, and the
risk of accidents are reduced as much when one commuter carpools all
of the time as when two commuters carpool half of the time. There is
no obvious rationale, then, to limit how much carpooling each claim-
ant is encouraged to do.119
Second, in some cases claimants are not fungible-so we have to
ensure they are part of the group that uses the subsidy effectively-
but the allocation within this group is less important. For instance, we
can reduce greenhouse gases more by installing solar panels in sunny
climates, as noted above. But once we impose that constraint, it does
not matter whether there is one on every house or two on every other
house in a given neighborhood. In fact, a weather-related require-
ment may be unnecessary, since residents of sunny climates are the
most likely buyers anyway, as noted above. Instead, requiring a
claimant to bear some of the cost (a "matching mechanism") may be
118 See Schizer, note 36, at 247.
119 Of course, there may be other reasons why some vehicles add particular social value,
such as ambulances and police cars. Although they also contribute to congestion, we still
may want to exempt them from anti-congestion policies because of the unique social con-
tribution they make.
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sufficient. We can offer the lowest subsidy needed to induce enough
claimants to install solar panels, knowing that environmentalists and
wealthier households (all in sunny climates) are most likely to claim it.
Of course, excess burden and distribution could affect this assessment
as well.
The analysis is similar when we want to reduce energy imports for
national security reasons. Weather stripping conserves heating oil
more effectively in cold climates, as noted above. Within this parame-
ter, though, a subsidy can save the same amount of energy on Michi-
gan Avenue as on the South Side of Chicago. If so, the most cost-
effective way to generate these programmatic benefits is to subsidize
the more responsive claimant. Indeed, if the Michigan Avenue family
is more responsive-and they also have a ski cabin in Colorado-a
second subsidy for them could make sense (again, setting aside excess
burden and distribution). The analysis is similar for a subsidy that
reduces energy imports by promoting fuel-efficient vehicles.
Third, in other cases it does matter who engages in the subsidized
conduct, but the government is not well positioned to screen claim-
ants. For example, we are not indifferent about who claims the R&D
subsidy, since some are more likely to engage in promising research.
But as noted above, the government often lacks the expertise (and
political independence) to choose technological winners. Likewise,
the charitable subsidy is supposed to promote experiments that the
median voter would not (yet) fund; by definition, a politically account-
able institution is not well suited to implement this strategy. Instead
of relying on the government to choose among competing proposals,
then, these tax expenditures use vague language (for example, "tech-
nological in nature" 2o) or rough proxies (for example, the nonprofit
form1 21) to create a broad class of potentially eligible claimants. Fur-
ther winnowing is accomplished with a matching mechanism. If we
are reasonably confident in this allocation method, we can treat R&D
and charity as more like aggregate than individualized tax expendi-
tures. After all, the goal is not to ensure that every taxpayer engages
in a minimum level of research and philanthropy, but to encourage
more of this conduct overall at the lowest possible cost. Unlike with
the EITC or subsidized health insurance, then, there is no obvious
reason why marginal programmatic benefits decline as individual ac-
tivity levels increase.
This third category of aggregate tax expenditures, which is premised
on the government's inability to allocate the funding effectively, is
perhaps the most contestable. Admittedly, we might still want a per-
120 IRC § 41(d).
121 IRC § 170.
2015]
TAX LAW REVIEW
claimant cap if we are skeptical about these nondirective allocations,
since a cap can limit losses from misguided projects. 122 Or we might
want to limit the private benefits that claimants receive, such as pres-
tige or personal satisfaction from giving to charity.123 Alternatively, in
the case of the charitable deduction, we might favor a cap so taxpayers
have to participate, at least to a degree, in funding publicly deter-
mined priorities; presumably, this communitarian notion underlies
current law's cap on the charitable deduction. 124 Yet these rationales
for a cap are different from those for individualized subsidies: Instead
of seeking more bang for the buck, they minimize risk or limit harm to
other values. In any event, even if we do not want a per-claimant cap,
we may want a per-claimant floor. If most businesses engage in some
R&D and most taxpayers give at least some charity anyway, subsi-
dizing the first dollar is wasteful, as noted above. In making these
judgments, we also have to consider excess burden and distribution.
While this Article distinguishes between aggregate and individual-
ized tax expenditures, the difference is more of a spectrum than a di-
chotomy. Some tax expenditures have elements of both. As a result,
how we classify a tax expenditure-and, more importantly, how we
limit it-depends on our policy priority. For example, while an educa-
tion subsidy can create positive externalities in funding a basic educa-
tion that leads to self-sufficiency, as noted above, it also can create
positive externalities in funding an advanced education that leads to
scientific research, public service, or entrepreneurship. 125 Similarly, a
retirement savings subsidy can generate positive externalities in pro-
moting not only self-sufficiency, but also capital formation, which con-
tributes to economic growth. In each case, a subsidy pursuing the first
goal (self-sufficiency) generates externalities in encouraging a mini-
mum level per claimant of education or savings, but not more; yet a
122 For example, if wealthy people have idiosyncratic or unrepresentative preferences,
this would counsel in favor of limiting the donations of each individual and encouraging a
broader base of donors. Hines & Logue, note 1, at 4 n.15. However, if there is no system-
atic difference between small and large gifts, the aggregate approach is better. The same
obviously is true if large donors make better decisions, for instance, if they invest more
time and thought or provide useful monitoring. See Schizer, note 36, at 242-48.
123 If this "warm glow" declines with giving, that could justify a cap; on the other hand, if
warm glow increases with giving (for instance, because larger gifts enable the donor to
achieve a more ambitious goal), a cap could be problematic. In any event, the assumption
that warm glow contributes to welfare is a contested point. See Diamond, note 31, at 909,
916 (arguing that warm glow might not add to social welfare).
124 Individuals may not claim a charitable deduction equal to more than 30% or 50% of
their AGI. IRC § 170(b)(1)(B). For a critique of this limit, see Schizer, note 36, at 248-50.
125 See, e.g., Richard R. Nelson & Edmund S. Phelps, Investment in Humans, Techno-
logical Diffusion, and Economic Growth, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 69, 69-71 (1966) (positing that
education has positive externalities in facilitating technological innovation, and in enabling
a society to apply these innovations more rapidly and more broadly).
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subsidy pursuing the second goal (human capital or capital formation)
also generates externalities at higher levels of education or savings, so
we would want to encourage as much as possible across the board. As
a result, a per-claimant cap may no longer be a good fit.
Likewise, a child credit can have this sort of hybrid quality, since it
can be used to pursue different goals. One is to avoid societal
problems from a shrinking population, such as an inadequate labor
force or bankrupt social insurance.1 26 To do so, we would encourage
more children overall, without regard to who is having them (an ag-
gregate subsidy). However, a different goal is to provide assistance to
families who especially need it.127 This goal requires us to account for
each family's particular circumstances (including income and the num-
ber of children), so that an individual-by-individual analysis becomes
relevant.
To sum up, a subsidy generally should equal the (net) positive mar-
ginal externalities it generates. In structuring a tax expenditure, then,
we have to account for the different reasons why it generates positive
(or negative) externalities-or, at least, to decide which is our priority.
As a result, some subsidies need to be calibrated on an individual-by-
individual basis, while some do not. Obviously, these are difficult and
contestable decisions, especially since we also should account for ex-
cess burden and distribution. Given the fine-tuning that is necessary,
one-size-fits-all limits are unlikely to succeed.
7. Who Allocates the Funding?: Bureaucratic Strategies
In addition to defining the conduct, identifying the claimants, and
calibrating the amount of the subsidy, we should consider who should
make these decisions. Another tightening strategy, then, is to identify
which part of the government is best positioned to make and imple-
ment these judgments.
There are familiar arguments for converting tax expenditures to di-
rect expenditures, as Stanley Surrey and others have urged in an ex-
tensive literature. 128 For example, instead of excluding the interest on
state bonds from federal taxes, the federal government can make
grants for state and local government projects vetted by federal ex-
perts. The hope is that these experts could generate more program-
126 See Elaine Maag, Simplicity: Considerations in Designing a Unified Child Credit, 63
Nat'l Tax J. 765, 768 (2010).
127 Id.
128 See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures
98-100 (1973); Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, Tax Expenditures 108-11 (1985).
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matic benefits per dollar than an inexpert tax bureaucracy. 129
Likewise, congressional committees with greater substantive expertise
could monitor these programs, instead of tax committees. 130
On the other hand, sometimes tax experts in Congress and the exec-
utive branch have a comparative advantage in making these judg-
ments. This is likely to be the case, for instance, when subsidies are
means-tested (like the EITC) or allocated passively to avoid
politicized decisions (like R&D and charity). 131 The tax system also
can have an advantage when the goal is to communicate information
or influence norms. If the government wants to endorse particular
behavior-as a way to promote more favorable attitudes about it
among citizens-this "stamp of approval" has to be communicated in
a way that citizens will notice. Nearly all citizens file returns, so the
tax system can be an effective channel for this sort of message. 132
In any event, the issues discussed so far generally remain relevant if
a tax expenditure is converted to a direct expenditure. We still have
to decide how precisely to define the favored conduct, which claim-
ants to favor, how generous the subsidy should be, whether it should
be capped, and so on. Ultimately, the choice of whether to keep a
subsidy in the tax system turns on the factual and institutional con-
text.133 Obviously, excess burden and distribution are also relevant.
So once again, a one-size-fits-all answer will not be reliable. In any
event, given the extensive attention this issue has received elsewhere,
it is not the focus of this Article.
8. Caveat: Transition Costs
Finally, when we consider whether to scale back a tax expenditure,
we also have to account for familiar issues that arise with any change
of policy. Given the extensive literature on transitions, 34 the discus-
129 One way to address this issue is for the tax system to partner with another part of the
government. To claim a low-income housing credit, for instance, a taxpayer must be cho-
sen by a state housing finance agency. Mihir Desai, Dhammika Dharmapala & Monica
Singhal, Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 24
Tax Policy and the Economy 181, 184 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed., 2010).
130 See Kleinbard, note 64, at 367 ("The substantive committees do not supervise how
tax subsidies are designed or spent, they do not track the efficacy of the tax programs, they
do not necessarily coordinate that spending with their own spending...").
131 See IRC §§ 32 (EITC), 170 (charitable contributions), 174 (R&D expenditures).
There may be institutional or structural constraints on the type of means testing possible
under the tax system. See Alstott, note 35, at 289-97.
132 IRS, Statistics of Income 2012: Individual Income Tax Returns 2 tbl.A (2014), availa-
ble at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12inalcr.pdf (noting 144 million individual tax returns
were filed in 2012).
133 See Weisbach & Nussim, note 65, at 957-58.
134 For an analysis of transition issues, see generally Daniel Shaviro, When Rules
Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Relief and Retroactivity (2000);
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sion here is very brief. In deciding how rapidly to phase in an other-
wise desirable reform, we need to balance long-term gains against
short-term impact. Even for the same policy change, these short-term
consequences vary with the context. For example, scaling back the
mortgage interest deduction could have had positive short-term ef-
fects in 2003, taking steam out of the housing bubble. But in 2009,
after the bubble burst, further pressure on this distressed market
would have been problematic in the short term.135
We also need to consider the benefits and costs of encouraging peo-
ple to anticipate policy changes. There are familiar advantages when
doing so persuades them not to engage in socially destructive behav-
ior. At the same time, there is a downside. If taxpayers discount tax
expenditures for the possibility of repeal, they are less responsive to
them.136 This raises the cost of inducing socially valuable behavior.
Again, the balance of these (and other) factors-and, thus, the transi-
tion policy we want in a given case-will depend on the context.
To sum up, then, a key goal in scaling back tax expenditures is sav-
ing money while preserving (most) programmatic benefits. There are
a number of ways to do this, and we should choose the one best suited
to the policy priority and the factual context. In some cases, we
should narrow the definition of what is funded. In others, we should
target the right claimants or limit how much they can claim. In still
other cases, we should use a different government agency to imple-
ment the subsidy. On all these policy dimensions, strategies that work
for one tax expenditure will not necessarily work for another.
C. Potential Trade-off. Does Repealing or Limiting a Tax
Expenditure Add to Excess Burden?
Even if a limit is effective at preserving programmatic benefits, we
face a trade-off if it exacerbates excess burden or undermines distribu-
tional goals. These issues are discussed in this and the following Sec-
tion, respectively. To assess the impact on excess burden, this Section
considers three questions. First, how (if at all) would repeal or a limit
affect the effective marginal tax rate, or otherwise influence labor and
savings decisions? Second, how would repeal or a limit influence
Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, (1977); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions,
99 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1986).
135 See Morrow, note 33, at 751.
136 See Graetz, note 134, at 49.
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compliance, enforcement, and other administrative costs? Third, how
would repeal or a limit impact deadweight loss from tax planning?
1. Effect on Labor and Savings Decisions
a. Weakening Tax Expenditures that Promote Work or Savings
Repealing or limiting a tax expenditure can affect labor and savings
decisions in five ways. First, if a tax expenditure (or some other gov-
ernment program) is effective in encouraging work or savings, repeal-
ing or limiting it can have the opposite effect. For example, if the
EITC successfully promotes work, scaling it back can induce some to
leave the workforce. On the other hand, if a tax expenditure is a com-
plement to leisure, repealing or limiting it can encourage work. For
instance, if the tax-free treatment of workman's compensation 137
tempts claimants to seek it even if they are able to work, repealing this
tax benefit eliminates this temptation.
b. Base-Broadening to Cut Marginal Rates (or Keep them from
Rising)
Second, even if a tax expenditure has no obvious connection to sav-
ings or work choices, repealing or limiting it can still alter a taxpayer's
effective marginal rate. Even more than average rates, marginal rates
influence labor and savings decisions.138 A familiar rationale for re-
peal or limits, then, is to fund a cut in marginal rates (or to keep these
rates from rising). This effect does not stem from the limit itself, but
from the way we use the savings it generates. Obviously, it can arise
with direct expenditures as well (for example, if we cut government
spending to fund a marginal rate cut).
137 See IRC § 104.
138 Hines & Logue, note 1, at 17 ("High marginal tax rates depress the production of
taxable income by encouraging early retirement, reducing work effort of primary and sec-
ondary earners, and giving taxpayers incentives to pursue investments and other opportu-
nities that reduce taxable income."); see also Manning & Andress, note 42, at 1586 ("This
article concentrates on marginal rates rather than average rates or overall tax burden on
the ground that marginal rates are the items that should affect economic decisions, deter-
mining the net after-tax value of engaging in activities to earn additional income or the net
after-tax cost of making expenditures that result in additional deductions."); Harvey S.
Rosen, What Is Labor Supply and Do Taxes Affect It?, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1980, at 171,
171-72; Emmanuel Saez, Joel Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income
with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review, 50 J. Econ. Literature 3, 3-5
(2012). Or it might be, as Joel Slemrod and Wojciech Kopczuk have argued, that broaden-
ing the base makes taxable income less elastic-for instance, by foreclosing certain types of
planning-so that we can raise rates at a lower efficiency cost. See Joel Slemrod &
Wojciech Kopczuk, The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income, 84 J. Pub. Econ. 91, 104-07
(2002).
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c. Bracket Creep
Third, repeal or a limit alters the effective marginal rate more di-
rectly by reducing a taxpayer's deductions or exclusions, and thus
bumping her into a higher bracket. 139 For example, a taxpayer would
be in the 25% bracket with $20,000 of deductions and $100,000 of in-
come, but would move to the 28% bracket upon losing $10,000 of de-
ductions (since the top of the 25% bracket for 2014 is $89,350). 140
This Article calls this result "bracket creep," analogizing to a compa-
rable effect of inflation. Bracket creep can affect anyone who is not
already in the top bracket. It arises in scaling back exclusions and
deductions, but not credits (which offset tax directly, instead of reduc-
ing taxable income). This effect arises with (some) tax expenditures,
but not with other government programs.
To eliminate bracket creep, we could "index" the bracket by raising
its upper bound. For example, if a limit disallows an average of $5,000
of deductions, we could raise the top of each bracket by $5,000. Yet
this remedy is imperfect since those who lose less than $5,000 receive
a windfall, while those who lose more still experience some bracket
creep. 141
d. Income-Based Limits
Fourth, some limits change the effective marginal rate by tying the
disallowance of tax benefits to income. If earning more causes tax-
payers to lose more deductions, exclusions, or credits, a limit functions
as a marginal rate increase. By contrast, if earning more entitles tax-
payers to use more of them, a limit reduces the effective rate. These
changes in the effective tax rate are oblique instead of explicit, so tax-
payers who do not notice them may not change their behavior.142 Part
III analyzes seven types of limits to show which change the effective
rate in this way, and which do not. In principle, any government ben-
efit or penalty tied to income could have this effect, including direct
expenditures (and fines) as well as tax expenditures.
139 See Sullivan, note 42, at 940 ("The basic intuition regarding why these limitations can
raise marginal rates is that each one in its own way ... shifts the higher rates of the pro-
gressive rate structure down the income scale .... ).
140 Rev. Proc. 2013-35, § 3.01, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (Oct. 31) (noting 2014 tax brackets).
141 A more comprehensive (and complicated) remedy would be to compute the tax with-
out accounting for the new deduction limit, and then add a separate tax on the disallowed
deduction, which would be computed with the marginal rate that would apply if not for the
limit.
142 See Galle, note 27, at 62 ("[I]n order for a tax to induce behavioral changes from the
taxpayer, the taxpayer must usually first be aware of the tax.").
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e. Reduced Purchasing Power
Finally, scaling back a tax expenditure (or, indeed, any subsidy) also
makes the favored activity more expensive. For instance, if charitable
contributions cannot be deducted, they cost more (in after-tax dol-
lars).1 43 This reduced purchasing power weakens the incentive to
work in some cases, but strengthens it in others. Someone whose
main motive in working is to fund her favorite charity might be more
tempted to retire.1 44 But someone who is already locked into a chari-
table pledge, which has become more expensive, must earn more to
honor it. If a subsidy is cut, people who were spending marginal dol-
lars on the subsidized activity-that is, dollars they might choose not
to earn-are more likely to adjust work choices than people who
spend inframarginal dollars. 145 Likewise, heavy users of a newly lim-
ited tax expenditure obviously are affected more than light users. For
example, limiting the mortgage deduction could have no effect on
renters (unless, of course, rent increases as more want to rent). As a
result, the magnitude (and even the direction) of these effects vary.146
143 See Alan J. Auerbach & Joel Slemrod, The Economic Effects of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, 35 J. Econ. Literature 589, 602 (1997) ("Stating [s]uch a tax reform decreases the
real wage in terms of the previously preferred activity").
144 If the charitable deduction is unlimited, this goal can be funded with pretax income.
In pursuing this goal, then, a taxpayer's marginal rate is zero. This can be a powerful
incentive to work. Cf. Diamond, note 31, at 898 ("For a given level of public good provi-
sion, higher private donations by high earners than low earners eases the incentive compat-
ibility constraint for donors and so can raise social welfare.").
145 For example, assume Ann and Bob each can earn either $360,000 or $400,000, de-
pending on how much they work. Ann uses this extra money to fund all her charitable
giving; if she earns $400,000, she donates $40,000, but if she earns only $360,000, she gives
nothing to charity. In contrast, Bob gives one-tenth of every dollar to charity (that is, both
marginal and inframarginal earnings). If charity is deductible, Ann's effective marginal
rate on the extra $40,000 is zero. Yet Bob's effective marginal rate on this extra $40,000 is
higher. Since he would deduct only $4,000 of this $40,000, his effective marginal rate is
35.64% on this extra earnings (assuming a 39.6% rate on the $36,000 he does not contrib-
ute to charity). If the charitable deduction is disallowed, both have to pay the full 39.6%
rate on their extra $40,000 of earnings. Yet this is a much bigger jump for Ann (from 0%
to 39.6%) than it is for Bob (35.64% to 39.6%).
146 If Congress repeals a tax expenditure to fund lower marginal rates, the effect on
incentives to work turns on the balance of two competing effects: On one hand, reducing
the marginal rates sweetens the return to work; on the other hand, reducing purchasing
power erodes the return to work. The balance depends on the context-specific issues dis-
cussed above. Alan Auerbach and Joel Slemrod argue that "base broadening generally
[does not] stimulate labor supply" if the reform is both revenue- and distributionally neu-
tral. Auerbach & Slemrod, note 143, at 602 ("Lowering a tax rate from 25 percent to 20
percent by eliminating the deductibility of a consumption activity that comprised 20 per-
cent of taxable income does not increase the incentive to work unless the former deducti-
ble consumption activity is relatively more complementary to leisure than are other goods,
because such a tax reform decreases the real wage in terms of the previously preferred
activity at the same time it increases the real wage in terms of other goods."). Yet the
analysis changes when the reform no longer needs to be distributionally neutral, so that
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2. Effect on Administrative Costs and Planning
In addition to affecting labor and savings choices, repealing or limit-
ing a tax expenditure can also affect administrative costs and planning.
On one hand, if a tax expenditure adds significantly to these social
costs (for instance, by precipitating rampant fraud), repealing or limit-
ing it can reduce them. 147 On the other hand, the limit itself can add
to excess burden. It is another tax rule to be drafted, understood and
enforced, and also can prompt new planning strategies. Once again,
the net effect depends on the context. This Subsection gives examples
of how the five tightening strategies discussed above 148 can affect ad-
ministrative costs and planning.
a. Definitional Strategies
Defining the favored activity more precisely prompts a familiar
trade-off. A more tailored tax expenditure (or other subsidy) focuses
more effectively on high-value activities, but is more challenging to
draft. Enforcement and compliance may be costlier as well if the rule
requires taxpayers to keep careful records or apply nuanced distinc-
tions. For instance, assume we want to subsidize health care that cre-
ates positive externalities, but not health care that yields only private
benefits. One option is to classify all types of care (for example, cov-
ering vaccinations but not cosmetic surgery). Alternatively, we can
disallow a standard percentage of the deduction or exclusion (a "hair-
cut") to approximate this effect, as we do with business entertain-
ment. 49 This blunter approach is cheaper to administer, but is only
approximately right at best.
b. Elasticity Strategies
A similar trade-off arises in tailoring a tax expenditure (or other
subsidy) to the claimant's responsiveness. Administrative costs in-
crease, and planning may as well. For example, we can disallow chari-
table deductions below a certain amount each year. This floor reduces
recordkeeping, and also avoids subsidizing some contributions that
would be made anyway.
heavy and light users, as well as people whose spending is marginal or inframarginal, can
fare differently.
147 Indeed, Slemrod and Kopczuk have argued that base broadening can shut off the
escape valves that tax-sensitive taxpayers use to avoid tax, so that we can then raise rates at
a lower efficiency cost. See Slemrod & Kopczuk, note 138, at 104-07.
148 See Section III.B.
149 See IRC § 274(n).
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Yet taxpayers can react by concentrating multiyear gifts into a sin-
gle year. For example, a taxpayer who earned $500,000 and gave
$25,000 to charity each year would lose 20% of her deduction ($5,000
of $25,000) with a 1% floor. But if she gave $50,000 every other year,
she would lose only 10% ($5,000/$50,000). She gives the same amount
on average but cuts her disallowed deductions in half.
This sort of "bunching" is less likely, though, when claimants do not
fully control the timing of their giving. For example, they may have to
make a gift for a particular event, such as a religious holiday or an
annual dinner. It is likely, moreover, that some claimants would be
less rigorous about shifting their donations, and some nonprofits
would be less accommodating. For claimants who are unable to shift
all their charity, there would be less advantage to shifting any of it.
For instance, if the floor was $200-and a claimant had at least $200 of
charity that could not be shifted-the floor no longer would create an
incentive to shift other contributions. This is more likely to happen, of
course, when the floor is low.
Even for high floors, moreover, the motive to concentrate deduc-
tions is offset, to an extent, by a countervailing incentive to spread
them more evenly: If "bunching" moves a taxpayer to a lower tax
bracket, it reduces the value of some of her deductions. For example,
assume a married couple has $500,000 of income. If they claim
$40,000 of deductions each year, they remain in the 39.6% bracket
(which governs taxable income above $457,600 in 2014).150 As a re-
sult, all their deductions are worth 39.6 cents per dollar. But what if
instead they claim $80,000 in 2014 and no deductions in 2015? This
"bunching' moves them to the 35% bracket (which governs taxable
income above $405,100).151 As a result, over $37,000 of the deduc-
tions they accelerate are worth only 35 cents per dollar (in reducing
taxable income from $457,600 to $420,000).152 This cost of "bunching"
arises only if a tax expenditure's value varies with the tax bracket; as a
result, it applies to deductions and exclusions, but not credits. The
magnitude of this cost depends on how steep the rate structure is, and
also how close a claimant is to a lower bracket. For instance, those
earning $3 million are unlikely to be affected, since they need to
"bunch" almost $2.5 million of deductions to move to a lower bracket.
150 See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, § 3.01, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (Oct. 31).
151 Id.
152 At the risk of belaboring the point, what if the couple concentrates three years of
deductions into a single year? Their taxable income falls to $380,000, putting them in the
33% bracket (which governs taxable income above $226,850). Id. As a result, over $25,000
of their accelerated deductions are worth only 33 cents per dollar (that is, in reducing taxa-
ble income from $405,100 to $380,000).
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c. Comparative Advantage Strategies
Just as trade-offs arise in calibrating a subsidy to elasticity, they also
can arise in targeting claimants who use a tax expenditure (or other
subsidy) most effectively. For example, sorting with substantive crite-
ria (like weather or geography) can add to administrative costs, since
these conditions have to be formulated and enforced. Likewise, allo-
cating the subsidy with a competitive process also can be expensive,
since government personnel are needed to run it and claimants incur
costs in participating. In contrast, matching requirements (like the
ones used for R&D and charity) are simple to administer, once we set
the right level for the match. Screening by income is also easy, since
the tax system has to measure income anyway.
d. Activity-Level Strategies
Imposing an overall or per-claimant cap on tax expenditures (or
other subsidies) also can add to administrative costs. Yet if we do not
make this investment, the subsidy may not be allocated as effectively.
In some cases, administrative costs are not only the consequence of
varying the reimbursement rate, but also the cause. Tracking an ex-
pense (such as a charitable contribution) could be cost-justified at a
high level, but not a low level. This trade-off will vary for different tax
expenditures. For example, it is probably easier to track low levels of
mortgage interest (usually paid to a single bank) than low levels of
charity (often paid to multiple causes).
e. Bureaucratic Strategies
Finally, a familiar argument for converting tax expenditures to di-
rect expenditures is reducing administrative costs. Yet the argument
is not persuasive if costs are merely shifted within the government. 153
Once again, the answer depends on the context. Administrative costs
rise if the tax system has to develop expertise that already exists else-
where in government, but not if the tax system already has the rele-
vant expertise (for example, in making income-based judgments). 154
Moreover, piggybacking on private sector judgments, as with R&D
and charity, does not require much substantive expertise.
153 See Weisbach & Nussim, note 65, at 958 ("If we mistakenly look only at the tax
system instead of overall government policy, we will draw the wrong conclusions.").
154 See Zelinsky, note 104, at 1010 ("Tax incentives efficiently communicate government
policies through an existing information network, that is, the network of professional ad-
vice and assistance that exists to comply with the tax law.").
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To sum up, then, a second goal in scaling back tax expenditures is
reducing excess burden (or, at least, minimizing increases). Effects on
labor and savings choices, administrative costs, and planning are all
important, and also context-specific. Sometimes our programmatic
and excess burden goals are compatible, but sometimes they are in
tension.
D. Potential Trade-off: Does Repealing or Limiting a Tax
Expenditure Undermine Distribution?
In repealing or limiting tax expenditures, we want to save money,
preserve programmatic benefits, and minimize excess burden. In as-
sessing progress on these dimensions, we have to account for distribu-
tion. Effects on low-income taxpayers-both benefits and costs-are
especially significant because of the declining marginal utility of
money. How much of a premium we assign to their welfare depends
on our social welfare function.15 5 To determine a limit's effect on dis-
tribution, we should consider three issues. First, who is helped (or
hurt) by a tax expenditure under current law? Second, how does the
answer change if we limit the tax expenditure in various ways? Third,
if a limit has adverse distributional effects, can we compensate by ad-
justing other aspects of the tax-and-transfer system? These issues are
considered in turn.
155 For example, we have to choose how much weight, if any, to give to horizontal eq-
uity, the principle that people with like incomes should be treated alike. Horizontal equity
is sometimes used to justify tax expenditures (for example, the mortgage interest deduction
aligns the tax treatment of home purchases for cash and credit), to critique them (for ex-
ample, tax is lower for those who receive health insurance through work), as well as to
critique limits on them (for example, a cap on itemized deductions is more burdensome for
residents of high-tax states). More generally, some have observed that taxpayers with the
same income vary in their use of tax preferences. Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contribu-
tions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 Tax L. Rev. 37, 47 (1972) (explaining that
taxpayers in the same position utilizing deductions in differing amounts frustrates horizon-
tal equity); Hines & Logue, note 1, at 4 (critiquing "disparities in effective tax rates be-
tween those taxpayers who have a strong taste (or comparative advantage) for tax
preferences ... and those who do not."). Yet, the norm's value is contested because it is
malleable. For instance, we can debate whether taxpayers are similar enough to warrant
the same treatment, while efforts to create horizontal equity between A and B might lead
to horizontal inequity with C. In addition, market adjustments can sometimes mitigate
horizontal inequities. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1189, 1241-42 (1989). As a result, the norm may not add much to vertical
equity. See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 Nat'l
Tax J. 139, 143-44 (1989).
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1. The Distributional Impact of Tax Expenditures Under Current
Law
a. Tax Benefits for Most Tax Expenditures Flow Disproportionately
to High-Income Taxpayers
If a tax expenditure (or, indeed, any government program) dispro-
portionately helps high-income taxpayers, scaling it back would en-
hance vertical equity. But how do we know who is benefitting? One
measure for tax expenditures, which is conventional but imperfect, fo-
cuses on who claims the tax benefit. By this standard, high-income
taxpayers are the clear winners with most tax expenditures. For ex-
ample, 80% of the tax benefit for itemized deductions went to the top
20% in 2011.156 Likewise, two-thirds of exclusions went to the top
20%, including employer-provided health insurance and investment
income in retirement accounts.157
These tax benefits flow mostly to high-income taxpayers for four
familiar reasons. The first three apply only to tax expenditures, while
the fourth could apply to other subsidies as well. First, if taxpayers do
not earn enough to owe income tax, a tax expenditure cannot reduce
their tax bill (unless it is refundable or applies to the payroll tax).158
Second, even among those who pay income tax, only those who item-
ize (instead of claiming the standard deduction) are eligible for some
tax expenditures. This subset-less than one-third of filers in 2011
(46.2 million)159-tends to have higher incomes. Nearly half (19.4
million) had more than $100,000 of income, while over 10% (4.7 mil-
lion) had more than $200,000.160 Third, exclusions and deductions are
more valuable in a higher bracket. Excluding a dollar-that is, not
paying tax on it-saves thirty-five cents for someone taxed at 35%,
but only twenty-five cents for someone taxed at 25%. This "upside
down effect" does not arise with credits, which reduce the tax itself
instead of taxable income (so a one-dollar credit reduces tax by one
dollar). 161 Finally, high-income taxpayers tend to spend more on sub-
sidized expenses, such as health insurance, 401(k) plans, and mortgage
156 Daniel Baneman, Joseph Rosenberg, Eric Toder & Roberton Williams, Urban-
Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr., Curbing Tax Expenditures 11 (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/412493-Curbing-Tax-Expenditures.pdf.
157 Id. at 12.
158 Of 142.9 million returns filed in 2011, 58.4 million paid no income tax, although some
needed tax expenditures to zero out their liability. See IRS, Pub. No. 1304, Individual
Income Tax Returns 2011, at 33-35 tbl.1.1 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdftpl304.pdf.
159 See id. at 111-12 tbl.3.1.
160 See id. at 33-35 tbl.1.1.
161 Surrey, note 128, at 98-100; Surrey & McDaniel, note 128, at 108-11.
20151
TAX LAW REVIEW
interest. 162 For example, taxpayers earning over $200,000 averaged
eight times more mortgage interest than those earning between
$40,000 and $50,000 in 2011 ($5021 versus $642).163
If a tax expenditure disproportionately reduces the taxes of high-
income taxpayers, limiting it usually raises their taxes. If the limit also
enhances efficiency-for instance, by offering more programmatic
"bang for the buck" or reducing excess burden-it offers a unique
opportunity. Although efficiency and distribution are often in ten-
sion, here they would be aligned.
b. Refundable Credits and Other Safety Net Tax Expenditures
Even so, distribution and efficiency sometimes are in tension for
two reasons. First, some tax expenditures are claimed solely (or pri-
marily) by low-income taxpayers, so that limiting them would dispro-
portionately affect this cohort. For example, the EITC is available
even to those who do not otherwise owe tax,164 as is the health cover-
age tax credit,165 the credit for excess social security withholding,166
the "making work pay" credit, 167 the homebuyer credit, 168 and por-
tions of the child credit 169 and American opportunity credit 170 (for
college expenses). 171 The bottom 60% of taxpayers claimed 80% of
tax benefits from refundable credits in 2011.172 Usually, refundable
credits are justified as much by distribution as by externalities-and,
in some cases, more so. As a result, there is a strong case for keeping
them if they are successful. Yet even then, it would be better still to
generate comparable distribution-based benefits at lower cost, if we
can.
162 Admittedly, limiting tax expenditures is a less effective way to raise revenue from the
"super rich." As Shaviro has observed, someone earning $10 million is unlikely to receive
employer-provided health insurance worth ten times what someone earning $1 million re-
ceives. Shaviro, note 39, at 429 n.14. If the goal is to slice distribution this finely, marginal
rates (or changes in the treatment of capital gains and dividends) are likely to have more
impact, although, of course, the efficiency considerations are different as well.
163 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 37 tbl.3.
164 IRC § 32(a).
165 IRC § 36B.
166 IRC § 45B.
167 IRC § 36A.
168 IRC § 36.
169 IRC § 24.
170 IRC § 25A.
171 See Cong. Budget Office, Pub. No. 4152, Refundable Tax Credits 3, 9 fig.4 (2013),
available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43767_RefundableTaxCredits_20120
.pdf.
172 See Eric Toder & Daniel Baneman, Urban-Brookings Tax Pol'y Ctr., Distributional
Effects of Individual Income Tax Expenditures: An Update 15 tbl.3, (Feb. 2, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412495-Distribution-of-Tax-Expenditures.pdf.
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c. Challenges in Measuring Incidence
Second, even if low-income taxpayers are not the ones claiming a
tax expenditure (or other subsidy), they may still benefit economically
from it, so that scaling it back is costly to them. For example, when
high-income taxpayers deduct charitable contributions for soup kitch-
ens or need-based scholarships, economic benefits flow to low-income
people.173 Yet charity to art museums or the opera is likely to have
different distributional effects. Similarly, although the tax benefit for
municipal bond interest goes to (wealthy) bondholders, much of the
economic benefit goes to states (in reducing their borrowing costs).
Likewise, while the deduction for state and local taxes is claimed by
high-income people, it can help states collect more tax.174 For both of
these tax expenditures, then, we need to know how states use the ex-
tra money. Enhancing social services for low-income citizens obvi-
ously has different effects than cutting property taxes on high-end
residences.
Needless to say, sometimes economic benefits actually do flow to
the person claiming the tax benefit. For instance, when a high-income
taxpayer deducts mortgage interest on a vacation home in Vail or East
Hampton, the government is funding private benefits for her (as well
as neighborhood-related externalities for a wealthy community).
Likewise, gold-plated health plans can provide private benefits to
high-income taxpayers.
Ultimately, then, we need to know a tax expenditure's economic
incidence to assess its distributional impact. 175 Unfortunately, this is
much harder than establishing who is claiming the tax benefit. A
rough guess may be the best we can do. Nevertheless, a rough answer
to the right question is more helpful than a precise answer to the
wrong question. In deciding whether to repeal or limit a tax expendi-
173 There is very little empirical evidence on the overall distributional impact from char-
ity, and the limited evidence is mixed. See, e.g., Charles T. Clotfelter, The Distributional
Consequence of Nonprofit Activities, in Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? 1, 22
(Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992) ("First, there is great diversity within the nonprofit sector,
and no overarching conclusions about the distributional impact can be made. This said, a
second finding is one stated in the negative: in no subsector is there evidence that benefits
are dramatically skewed away from the poor and toward the affluent. Conversely, there is
also evidence that relatively few nonprofit institutions serve the poor as a primary
clientele.").
174 See Bruce Bartlett, The Deduction for State and Local Taxes, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,
2013, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/the-deduction-for-state-and-local-
taxes/? r=O.
175 See Michael J. Graetz, Assessing the Distributional Effects of Income Tax Revision:
Some Lessons from Incidence Analysis, 4 J. Legal Stud. 351, 358 (1975) ("[E]stimates of
the distribution of these 'subsidies' [tax expenditures] by income class fail to take into
account instances where the incidence of the subsidy is different from its statutory
impact").
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ture, then, we need to consider whether low-income taxpayers are its
main economic beneficiaries, even if they are not the ones claiming
the tax benefit.
2. The Distributional Impact of the Limit
Repealing a tax expenditure eliminates all the tax and economic
benefits it provides. But a limit eliminates only some of these bene-
fits, affecting some claimants more than others. For example, if we
deny a tax expenditure to those earning more than $150,000, those
earning less can still claim it. Sometimes this sort of disparity brings
us closer to the distribution we want, but sometimes it has the oppo-
site effect. A context-specific analysis is needed to determine a limit's
effect on distribution. This Subsection offers examples drawn from
the five tightening strategies discussed above. 176
a. Definitional Strategies
One approach is to define favored conduct in a way that advances
distributional goals. For instance, some fringe benefits are subsidized
only if offered to all employees. 177 Including this "nondiscrimination"
rule in the relevant definition creates an incentive to cover low-in-
come employees, not just senior managers. Likewise, one subsidy for
home ownership excludes gains from selling a primary residence, but
not a vacation home. 178 This carve-out is more likely to burden high-
income taxpayers. Notably, there is no similar exception for the mort-
gage interest deduction. Adding one, as President Bush's 2005 tax re-
form panel suggested, would save money in a progressive way.179
In other cases, though, narrower definitions are an ineffective or
costly way to pursue distributional goals. For instance, although we
might want to offer the charitable deduction only to causes that help
low-income beneficiaries, this would be difficult to administer. While
soup kitchens obviously qualify, and the opera probably does not,
many causes are hard to classify. Disaster relief, for example, is rele-
vant to everyone, but can be especially important to low-income peo-
ple. In addition, what if a charity has some functions that qualify, and
some that do not? To deal with this, we could make separate judg-
ments about each gift, depending on how it is used. For instance, gifts
176 See Section III.B.
177 See IRC § 1320)(1).
178 See IRC § 121(a).
179 See Bush Panel, note 107, at 73 ("The Panel recommends that the deduction for
interest on mortgages on second homes and interest on home-equity loans be
eliminated.").
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to educational institutions would pass muster if they support financial
aid, but not professorships or building projects. Yet this approach
founders on the fungibility of money. After all, some gifts to financial
aid do not actually increase the financial aid budget; instead, they al-
low the school to allocate less tuition to financial aid, freeing up this
revenue for other initiatives. An alternative, then, is to treat all con-
tributions as tax-advantaged, as long as a sufficient percentage of the
organization's budget funds qualifying activities. But some budgetary
items would be hard to classify (for example, the CEO's salary or rent
for the building), and we would have to re-test periodically. This ap-
proach also penalizes nonprofit "conglomerates" that serve low-in-
come populations while also pursuing other goals. In any event, the
more general point is that a more focused definition is an effective
way to pursue distributional goals in some settings, but not others.
Once again, the context matters.
b. Elasticity Strategies
The same is true when we tighten a tax expenditure by favoring
claimants who are most responsive. High-income claimants usually
are easier to influence because they have more capacity in their budg-
ets, as noted above. While this is a reason to allocate a subsidy prima-
rily to them, distributional goals are undercut if the subsidy offers
them private benefits (as with subsidized vacation homes and "gold-
plated" health insurance) or creates externalities that do not benefit
low-income people (as with charity to the opera). Even so, there is no
trade-off if the externalities benefit everyone (as with solar panels) or
especially benefit low-income citizens (as with charity to soup kitch-
ens). In these cases, focusing on elasticity can improve distribution by
enabling the program to help low-income people more efficiently.
c. Comparative Advantage Strategies
Similarly, there is no one-size-fits-all answer when we favor claim-
ants who can use a subsidy most effectively. If a claimant's compara-
tive advantage derives from financial need (as with subsidized
retirement savings to promote self-sufficiency), favoring this claimant
advances distributional goals. Yet in other cases, there can be a trade-
off with distribution. For instance, what if a claimant's comparative
advantage derives from expertise, as with an R&D subsidy? Distribu-
tional goals are still advanced if the subsidy generates positive exter-
nalities for everyone (for example, in curing a disease), but can be
undercut if the subsidy generates private benefits for experts with high
incomes (for example, in raising the pay of medical researchers). The
2015]
economic incidence of the tax expenditure obviously is important, and
it varies with the context.
d. Activity-Level Strategies
We also encounter this sort of context-specific variability in cali-
brating how much to subsidize each claimant. Sometimes this sort of
fine-tuning advances distributional goals. For example, we might de-
cide to cap a subsidy for health insurance because low-income claim-
ants rarely have gold-plated policies. Indeed, if distribution is our
priority, we might prefer to phase out the subsidy instead of capping
it, so only low-income claimants are eligible. In other cases, however,
a per-claimant cap or phase-out would undercut distributional goals.
This would be the case with charity supporting soup kitchens, as well
as with other tax expenditures that generates positive externalities for
low-income people (instead of private benefits for high-income
claimants).
e. Bureaucratic Strategies
Finally, we see the same variation in deciding whether to use a tax
expenditure or a direct expenditure. For example, a familiar disad-
vantage of pursuing distributional goals with tax expenditures is the
"upside down" effect: Deductions and exclusions offer more gener-
ous tax benefits in higher brackets (although refundable credits avoid
this issue). In addition, the tax system sometimes is less effective in
imposing distribution-based conditions on how money is used. For in-
stance, if the federal government wants to fund states' programs for
low-income citizens, the deduction for state income tax offers less con-
trol than block grants. Nevertheless, the tax system has a notable ad-
vantage in pursuing distributional goals: a sophisticated capacity to
measure income and dispense money.
3. Compensating Adjustments
To sum up, then, it is important to account for distribution when we
consider scaling back tax expenditures. In some cases, distributional
goals justify the limit (for example, if a tax expenditure disproportion-
ately benefits high-income people). In other cases, distribution is a
reason not to impose a limit, or at least is a cost to be managed (for
example, if a tax expenditure helps low-income people, but in a costly
or inefficient way). In other words, sometimes efficiency and distribu-
tional goals align, but sometimes they are in tension.
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When there is a trade-off, a familiar way to manage it is to adopt a
limit that promotes efficiency, while advancing distribution another
way. For example, assume we want to limit the EITC to keep claim-
ants from committing fraud, but this limit would undercut distribution
by also affecting honest claimants. To offset this distributional cost,
we can pair the limit with a payroll tax cut for low-income taxpayers.
As a result, we achieve the distribution we want-or at least approxi-
mate it-in a more efficient way.
Unfortunately, this sort of offsetting distributional adjustment is not
always feasible. Some involve efficiency costs of their own, while
others are politically unattainable. When an offsetting adjustment is
not available, it becomes more important to accommodate distribu-
tion within the four corners of the limit. In managing this sort of
trade-off, we should compare different types of limits and choose the
one that enhances welfare the most, once all the competing factors are
considered.
IV. FLOORS, CAPS, AND FRACTIONS: SEVEN LIMITS
AND THE TRADE-OFFS THEY INVOLVE
To determine what offsetting adjustments we need, or to select the
limit that enhances welfare the most on its own, it is necessary to un-
derstand the trade-offs inherent in each limit. This Part analyzes
seven types of limits: fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors, fixed-
dollar caps, income-based caps, phase-outs, maximum fractions, and
haircuts. Each modifies the marginal reimbursement rate in a differ-
ent way. As a result, they have varying effects on programmatic in-
centives, excess burden, and distribution, and thus involve different
trade-offs. Some are especially useful for activity-level strategies,
while others are a good fit for elasticity strategies. Again, there is no
one-size-fits-all answer, so context-specific analysis is critical.
A. Fixed-Dollar Floors
One option is to use a floor, which keeps a tax expenditure from
supporting low levels of favored activity. A "fixed dollar" floor de-
fines this level as a fixed amount (instead of a percentage of income).
For example, charitable contributions could be subsidized only to the
extent they exceeded $500.180
180 The standard deduction is also a fixed-dollar floor. See IRC § 63(c).
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1. Programmatic Benefits
A floor eliminates programmatic incentives for activity below the
minimum level, but preserves them above this level. With a $500
floor, for instance, a taxpayer is subsidized for increasing charitable
giving from $500 to $1,000,181 but not from $0 to $500.
In preserving programmatic incentives for high activity levels, fixed-
dollar floors offer two advantages. First, they focus the subsidy on
these higher levels. As a result, fixed-dollar floors are well suited to
aggregate subsidies that encourage as much activity as possible, with-
out regard to who is engaging in it (for example, green energy and
charity). Second, floors help to avoid subsidizing what the taxpayer
would do anyway. If most people give at least $500 to charity without
a subsidy, a $500 floor concentrates the subsidy where it is more likely
to change behavior. Thus, a floor is a good fit for elasticity strategies.
Picking the right level is a challenge, though, since one that is margi-
nal for some is too high (or low) for others.
While a floor is well suited to these goals, it is a poor fit for motivat-
ing the first dollar of spending. Subsidizing low activity levels is essen-
tial in encouraging everyone to commit at least a minimum amount to
retirement savings, health insurance, or some other favored activity.
These individually-based subsidies need to motivate claimants who
otherwise would spend nothing (or very little). Floors keep subsidies
from reaching these people.
2. Excess Burden
Floors have the further disadvantage of increasing planning costs.
As noted above, they encourage taxpayers to concentrate multi-year
spending into a single taxable year (for example, giving charity every
other year). This strategy can reduce the amount disallowed by the
floor. 182 Even so, floors can reduce compliance costs. As noted
above, those who spend less than the floor do not need to keep
records.
3. Distribution
Just as fixed-dollar floors have mixed effects on programmatic in-
centives and excess burden, they also can affect distribution in differ-
ent ways. To help low-income people, we sometimes have to subsidize
the first dollar. This can be important, for instance, in encouraging
181 Cf. Ackerman & Auten, note 14, at 512 (explaining that under the Pease 3% limita-
tion, the "incentive for additional charitable contributions is not affected since the amount
of disallowed deductions depends only on AGI").
182 See Subsection III.C.2.
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them to save for retirement or buy health insurance. The first dollar is
more likely to be marginal for low-income claimants than high-income
ones, who usually take these steps on their own. In this sort of self-
sufficiency initiative, then, a floor can disproportionately exclude low-
income claimants. More generally, a fixed-dollar floor is likely to be
more daunting to low-income claimants than high-income ones.
Given the diminishing marginal utility of money, committing a fixed
amount of money is harder for those who earn less.
Yet this is a problem only if low-income people have to claim a
subsidy in order to benefit from it. This is not the case with charity for
soup kitchens, for instance, or with some environmental initiatives. If
a tax expenditure creates externalities that benefit low-income peo-
ple-even when they are not the ones claiming it-a floor can gener-
ate these externalities more efficiently, thereby enhancing
distribution.
4. Trade-offs
To sum up, then, fixed-dollar floors can be appealing when the goal
is to encourage as much favored activity as possible (as with green
energy or charity). These floors offer more programmatic bang for
the buck by not funding (some) inframarginal activity. They also can
reduce recordkeeping burdens. However, fixed-dollar floors are not
at all tailored to heterogeneity. They will be too high for some claim-
ants and too low for others. A further disadvantage is that they can
encourage taxpayers to consolidate multi-year spending into a single
year. 183 In addition, fixed-dollar floors should not be used when the
goal is to encourage at least a minimum level of favored activity (for
example, ensuring that everyone has health insurance), and also in
other contexts where the participation of low-income claimants is
important.
183 See Ackerman & Auten, note 14, at 513; Louis Kaplow, The Standard Deduction and
Floors in the Income Tax, 50 Tax L. Rev. 1, 27 (1994) (arguing that it is easy to "bunch"
payments when we control the timing of them, so that charity is easier to "bunch" than
mortgage interest).
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TABLE 1
FIXED-DOLLAR FLOORS
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for high activity levels with valuable externalities Yes
Benefits for high activity levels with diminishing returns Yes
Benefits for essential first dollar No
Benefits for inframarginal first dollar No
Benefits for responsive wealthy claimants Yes
Benefits for inframarginal wealthy claimants Yes
Excess Burden
Increased complexity Yes
Increased cost for favored activity Yes
Bracket creep Yes
Disguised rate increase No
Spreading No
Bunching Yes
Distribution
Disproportionate cuts for wealthy claimants No
Mitigated upside down effect No
Cost-effective externalities for low-income third parties Yes
B. Income-Based Floors
Instead of defining a floor as a fixed amount, it can be defined as a
percentage of the taxpayer's income (an "income-based floor"). For
example, we can limit the charitable deduction to contributions above
1% of AGI, as President Bush's tax reform panel suggested. 184 While
income-based floors share most of the advantages and disadvantages
of fixed-dollar floors, they are somewhat more effective at accommo-
dating elasticity and pursuing distributional goals. Nevertheless, they
have the offsetting disadvantage of increasing the effective marginal
rate.
1. Programmatic Incentives
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors maintain program-
matic incentives above the floor. In so doing, they are more effective
in accounting for elasticity. When we estimate how much a claimant
would give to charity without a subsidy, for example, a percentage of
income is more reliable than a fixed dollar amount. After all, a $500
floor is probably too high for someone earning $30,000 and too low
for someone earning $1 million. One percent of income is likely to be
closer to the mark for each ($300 and $10,000, respectively). As a
result, income-based floors are a good choice for encouraging as much
activity as possible, without regard to who is engaging in it (for exam-
184 See Bush Panel, note 107, at 75.
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pie, green energy and charity). They also share a key limitation of
fixed-dollar floors: Both are a poor choice for encouraging everyone
to engage in at least a minimum level of favored activity (for example,
retirement savings and health insurance).
2. Excess Burden
With one important difference, income-based floors have the same
effects on excess burden as fixed-dollar floors. On the positive side of
the ledger, they eliminate some recordkeeping. On the negative side,
both encourage taxpayers to bunch multi-year spending into a single
year.
Yet income-based floors have a disadvantage that fixed-dollar floors
do not share: When claimants earn more money, they lose more of
the tax expenditure. For example, the Pease rule increases the effec-
tive marginal rate in this way. Although this provision often is de-
scribed as a phase-out, it actually is an income-based floor.185
Taxpayers lose 3 cents of itemized deductions for every dollar of in-
come they earn above a threshold ($250,000 for an individual). 86 For
taxpayers in the 39.6% bracket, losing 3 cents of deductions costs 1.2
cents (3 x 0.396). This is a 1.2% increase in the effective marginal
rate. 18 7 A 1% floor on charitable deductions has a similar effect. An
additional $100 of earnings eliminates $1 of deductions, thereby in-
creasing tax by 39.6 cents, and thus increasing the effective marginal
rate by 0.396% (for those in the 39.6% bracket). By contrast, fixed-
dollar floors do not disallow more deductions as taxpayers earn more.
A $500 floor remains $500, even if the taxpayer's income increases. 188
Of course, income-based floors increase the marginal rate in this
way only when taxpayers actually have deductions to lose. Someone
whose charitable giving is above the floor is affected, but someone
who has not made any gift to charity is not. Earning an extra dollar
would not affect how many deductions the latter can claim.189
185 See, e.g., Altshuler & Dietz, note 51, at 466-71.
186 A taxpayer cannot lose more than 80% of her itemized deductions, so that someone
with very few itemized deductions might not be governed by the 3% rule. See IRC
§ 68(a)(1).
187 See Manning & Andress, note 42, at 1602 ("[A]lthough called an overall limitation,
the provision is basically an addition to the marginal rate above the threshold amount at 3
percent times the otherwise applicable rate..."); Shuldiner & Shakow, note 37, at 677,79.
188 Even so, a fixed-dollar floor can weaken work incentives by reducing the purchasing
power of marginal earnings, as discussed above. See Subsection III.C.l.b. For example,
assume someone wants to use her last dollar of earnings to contribute to charity, but a
floor disallows this deduction. In this case, the purchasing power of this marginal dollar of
earnings-and thus the return to working more-is reduced.
189 In addition, an income-based floor can also weaken work incentives by reducing a
taxpayer's purchasing power. See note Subsection III.C.1.
20151
TAX LAW REVIEW
3. Distribution
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors have mixed effects on
distribution. On one hand, when a tax expenditure creates externali-
ties that benefit low-income people, such as charity for soup kitchens,
an income-based floor can help it to do so more efficiently. On the
other hand, when a tax expenditure is supposed to encourage low-
income people to spend their first dollar on favored conduct, such as
health insurance or retirement savings, a floor can be
counterproductive.
While the distributional implications of both types of floors are sim-
ilar, they are not the same. There is a difference when the participa-
tion of low-income taxpayers is normatively important. In those
cases, income-based floors have an advantage in not using the same
floor for everyone. After all, giving more than $500 to charity is
harder for someone earning $30,000 than someone earning $1 million.
Yet although an income-based floor is better, it does not solve the
problem entirely. Given the diminishing marginal utility of money,
contributing 1% is harder for low-income claimants. In response, we
could further reduce the floor for those with low incomes (for exam-
ple, 0.5% for those earning $100,000 or less, and 1% for those earning
more). Yet as is often the case, solving one problem compounds an-
other: Increasing the percentage with income in this way creates a
bulge in the effective marginal rate. For example, if the floor is 0.5%
for those earning $100,000 and 1% for those earning more, earning a
dollar more than $100,000 increases the floor by $500. This means a
$1 increase in income (from $100,000 to $100,001) can increase the tax
bill by $140.190 Alternatively, if the increase from .5% to 1% is
phased in over a range, there would be a series of smaller bulges.191
Again, though, this is an issue only when the participation of low-in-
come claimants is normatively important.
4. Trade-offs
Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors are helpful in encour-
aging as much favored activity as possible (as with green energy and
charity), and in reducing recordkeeping burdens. These floors offer
more programmatic bang for the buck by not funding (some) in-
190 The floor increases from $500 to $1000.01. In 2014, a single person earning $100,000
has a (stated) marginal rate of 28%, so that losing $500 of deductions increases tax by $140.
Rev. Proc. 2013-35, § 3.01, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (Oct. 31).
191 For example, if the floor increases by 0.1 at five different points (one of which is
$100,000), then going from $100,000 to $100,001 increases the floor by $100, and thus in-
creases tax by $28.
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framarginal activity-indeed, they are better than fixed-dollar floors
on this dimension.
Yet these programmatic advantages must be balanced against ef-
fects on excess burden. Like fixed-dollar floors, income-based floors
encourage taxpayers to consolidate multi-year spending into a single
year. In addition, income-based floors increase the effective marginal
rate in a way that fixed-dollar floors do not, further sharpening the
trade-off between programmatic benefits and excess burden. In any
event, the programmatic advantages do not arise-so that income-
based floors are a poor fit-when the goal is to encourage at least a
minimum level of favored activity (for example, ensuring that every-
one saves for retirement, has health insurance, and the like).
TABLE 2
INCOME-BASED FLOORS
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for high activity levels with valuable externalities Yes
Benefits for high activity levels with diminishing returns Yes
Benefits for essential first dollar No
Benefits for inframarginal first dollar No
Benefits for responsive wealthy claimants Yes
Benefits for inframarginal wealthy claimants Yes
Excess Burden
Increased complexity Yes
Increased cost for favored activity Yes
Bracket creep Yes
Disguised rate increase Yes
Spreading No
Bunching Yes
Distribution
Disproportionate cuts for wealthy claimants No
Mitigated upside down effect No
Cost-effective externalities for low-income third parties Yes
C. Fixed-Dollar Caps
The mirror image of a floor is a cap, which imposes a maximum on
how much claimants can claim. Caps can be defined as a fixed-dollar
amount, as when Mitt Romney proposed a $25,000 cap on itemized
deductions. 192 Unlike floors, caps subsidize the first dollar of spend-
ing, but (potentially) not the last dollar. As a result, caps have quite
different uses than floors.
192 See Shaviro, note 39, at 426-27.
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1. Programmatic Incentives
A fixed-dollar cap preserves programmatic incentives below the
cap, while eliminating them above it. Therefore, this limit is useful for
encouraging at least a minimum level of favored activity, but not
more. For example, with a cap, the exclusion for employer-provided
health insurance subsidizes only basic health insurance, without moti-
vating claimants to get gold-plated policies.193 This increases the sub-
sidy's bang for the buck if basic insurance generates externalities, but
gold-plated policies yield mostly private benefits. If marginal positive
externalities also decline for retirement savings and home ownership
subsidies, caps are useful for them as well. Not surprisingly, then,
fixed-dollar caps already govern retirement savings and the health in-
surance exclusion (indirectly, through the "Cadillac tax"). Likewise,
mortgage interest is deductible only for mortgages of $1 million or
less. 194 Needless to say, the cap for each tax expenditure should be
different, since the relevant externalities are different.
Yet although caps can be a good fit for individualized subsidies,
they are not a good fit for aggregate subsidies, such as charity or green
energy. Since they eliminate programmatic incentives above the cap,
they do not encourage as much favored activity as possible, regardless
of who engages in it. They also are not a good fit for elasticity strate-
gies, since they do not deny the subsidy-or, at least, the first dollar of
it-to those who would engage in favored activity anyway.
The level of the cap should depend on context-specific factors, such
as the rate of decline in marginal externalities. This means it is likely
to vary for different tax expenditures. We will not successfully ac-
count for these differences if we apply the same cap to each tax expen-
diture-or, for that matter, a single "basket" cap to limit a group of
them.
2. Excess Burden
Fixed-dollar caps can exacerbate excess burden by increasing com-
pliance and enforcement costs. Taxpayers have to understand and
comply with these limits and the government must police them. In
addition, caps can encourage taxpayers to shift expenses from one
year to another, where there is still capacity in the cap. For instance,
assume the sum of all itemized deductions cannot exceed $25,000, and
a taxpayer earning $200,000 owes $12,000 in state tax. Since she has
only $13,000 of capacity left to deduct mortgage interest and charity,
193 The "Cadillac" tax in the Affordable Care Act effectively caps the exclusion, albeit
indirectly through an excise tax on the health plan. See IRC § 40801.
194 IRC § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
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she has reason to defer some charity until she has paid off the mort-
gage. This sort of spreading is the mirror image of the bunching trig-
gered by floors.
While fixed-dollar caps share this problem with floors (or, at least, a
variation of it), they avoid another: Unlike income-based floors,
fixed-dollar caps do not disallow more deductions as taxpayers earn
more. After all, Romney's cap would remain $25,000, whether some-
one earned $50,000 or $150,000. As a result, fixed-dollar caps do not
increase the effective marginal rate in the same way.
Even so, fixed-dollar caps can still affect work incentives by disal-
lowing deductions, and thus shifting taxpayers to a higher bracket. In
addition, by reducing after-tax purchasing power, caps can induce
people to work less (if they work to support their favorite charity) or
to work more (if they already made a charitable pledge, and need
more after-tax dollars to honor it). These effects vary depending on
whether claimants are heavy users of the relevant tax expenditure,
and whether they devote marginal earnings to it, as discussed
above.195 High-income taxpayers are more susceptible to these ef-
fects, since they spend more on tax-favored expenses, such as charity,
mortgage interest, and state taxes.
3. Distribution
For this reason, a fixed-dollar cap is more likely to take away tax
benefits from high-income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers. For
example, a $25,000 cap on itemized deductions is a tight constraint for
someone earning $1 million, but is unlikely to disallow any deductions
for someone earning $60,000. This is a tax increase almost exclusively
for high-income taxpayers. Yet if we focus on the economic benefits
provided by the tax expenditure, instead of the tax benefits, the as-
sessment becomes more complex. For instance, if a cap discourages a
high-income taxpayer from donating to a soup kitchen, its clientele is
also affected.
4. Trade-offs
Caps are extremely appealing when low activity levels generate ex-
ternalities, but higher levels do not add much. In these cases, caps
save money while foreclosing only modest externalities. They also
make the tax system more progressive, at least if we focus on tax bur-
dens instead of economic benefits. Although caps can add to compli-
ance costs and planning, they do not increase marginal rates in the
195 See Subsection III.C.l.e.
2015]
330 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:
same way that income-based floors do. As a result, caps can offer a
"grand slam" for tax expenditures whose marginal benefits decline as
activity levels rise. This might be the case, for instance, for health
insurance, mortgage interest, and retirement savings. Yet caps are less
helpful when the goal is to encourage as much favored activity as pos-
sible, since they eliminate programmatic incentives above the cap.
They also do not help to avoid subsidizing what claimants would do
anyway.
TABLE 3
FIXED-DOLLAR CAPS
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for high activity levels with valuable externalities No
Benefits for high activity levels with diminishing returns No
Benefits for essential first dollar Yes
Benefits for inframarginal first dollar Yes
Benefits for responsive wealthy claimants Yes
Benefits for inframarginal wealthy claimants Yes
Excess Burden
Increased complexity Yes
Increased cost for favored activity Yes
Bracket creep Yes
Disguised rate increase No
Spreading Yes
Bunching No
Distribution
Disproportionate cuts for wealthy claimants Yes
Mitigated upside down effect No
Cost-effective externalities for low-income third parties No
D. Income-Based Caps
Instead of a fixed amount, a cap can be defined as a percentage of
income (an "income-based cap"). For example, current law limits
charitable deductions to 30% (or in some cases 50%) of AGI.196
1. Programmatic Incentives
Income-based caps offer largely the same programmatic costs and
benefits as fixed-dollar caps. Since they eliminate programmatic in-
centives above the cap, they are a poor fit for encouraging as much
activity as possible. In subsidizing the first dollar of favored activity,
they risk subsidizing what claimants would do anyway. Yet like fixed-
196 IRC § 170(b)(1)(B). Or the cap can be defined in terms of the tax benefit, rather
than the favored expenditure, as Feldstein has proposed. See Feldstein et al., note 8, at
505-06.
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dollar caps, income-based caps are useful for subsidizing a minimum
level of favored activity, but not more.
A notable difference, though, is that income-based caps are less ef-
fective when a fixed dollar amount is the most precise way to specify
the targeted level. For example, if the goal is to subsidize basic (but
not gold-plated) health insurance, we should reference the price of an
average premium. Since this price represents a different percentage
of income for each claimant, an income-based cap is a blunt way to
target this level.
Yet income-based caps have an offsetting advantage. At least to an
extent, they are automatically indexed for inflation (since incomes rise
with inflation), as well as for regional variation (since income corre-
lates with regional costs of living). This is not a trivial advantage. Af-
ter all, if we use the average 2014 premium as a fixed-dollar cap for
health insurance, but do not adjust it for inflation, the cap becomes
too low over time. Likewise, if we use the same fixed-dollar cap for
the entire nation, it will be too low in some places and too high in
others.197 While this problem can be fixed with indexation, income-
based caps have the virtue of not requiring this remedy.
2. Excess Burden
Income-based caps have another advantage not shared by fixed-dol-
lar caps: They reduce the effective marginal rate, since earning more
frees up more deductions. For instance, if itemized deductions are
capped at 10% of AGI, a taxpayer with $500,000 of income can deduct
only $50,000. Earning an extra dollar increases deductions by 10
cents, reducing tax by 3.96 cents in the top bracket. This cuts the ef-
fective marginal rate by 3.96% (from 39.6% to 35.64%).198 In this
way, income-based caps are the mirror image of income-based floors,
which increase the effective marginal rate. As a result, income-based
caps have the added advantage of potentially mitigating labor and sav-
ings distortions. Otherwise, they have the same effect on excess bur-
den as fixed-dollar caps. They increase compliance and enforcement
costs. Both also can induce a taxpayer to shift expenses from one year
to another.
197 Cf. Inst. of Med. of the Nat'l Academics, Variations in Health Care Spending: Target
Decision Making, Not Geography 1-22 (Joseph P. Newhouse, Alan M. Garber, Robin P.
Graham, Margaret A. McCoy, Michelle Mancher & Ashna Kibria ed., 2013), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=18393 (confirming that health care costs
vary substantially by region).
198 Even so, an income-based cap can weaken work incentives by reducing the purchas-
ing power of marginal earnings. See note 188.
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3. Distribution
While fixed-dollar caps are tighter constraints on high-income
claimants than low-income claimants, as noted above, this is not nec-
essarily true of income-based caps. Although high-income claimants
spend a larger absolute amount on tax-favored expenses, do they
spend a larger percentage of their income? They probably do in some
cases (for example, state income tax), but not in others (for example,
health insurance). In addition, we should focus not only on tax bene-
fits generated by the tax expenditure, but also on economic benefits.
Again, if a cap keeps high-income donors from supporting a soup
kitchen, the low-income clientele is affected as well.
4. Trade-offs
Like fixed-dollar caps, income-based caps are useful when marginal
programmatic benefits decline as the activity level rises. They save
money while eliminating programmatic incentives that are not espe-
cially valuable (although probably in a less precise way than fixed-
dollar caps). They reduce effective marginal rates (something that
fixed-dollar caps do not do), and may also make the tax system more
progressive, at least if we focus on tax benefits instead of on economic
benefits. As a result, income-based caps can offer a grand slam for tax
expenditures whose marginal benefits decline as activity levels rise.
Depending on the empirics, this could be true of health insurance,
retirement savings, and mortgage interest.
Yet like fixed-dollar caps, income-based caps are less helpful when
the goal is to encourage as much favored activity as possible, since
they eliminate programmatic incentives above the cap. They also do
not help us avoid subsidizing what claimants would do anyway.
TABLE 4
Income-Based Caps
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for high activity levels with valuable externalities No
Benefits for high activity levels with diminishing returns No
Benefits for essential first dollar Yes
Benefits for inframarginal first dollar Yes
Benefits for responsive wealthy claimants Yes
Benefits for inframarginal wealthy claimants Yes
Excess Burden
Increased complexity Yes
Increased cost for favored activity Yes
Bracket creep Yes
Disguised rate increase No
Spreading Yes
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Bunching No
Distribution
Disproportionate cuts for wealthy claimants No
Mitigated upside down effect No
Cost-effective externalities for low-income third parties No
E. Phase-Outs and Cliffs
Phase-outs and cliffs deny tax benefits to those who earn more than
a minimum amount. The disallowance occurs all at once with a cliff,
and over a range with a phase-out. Under current law, phase-outs
apply to the EITC,199 child credit,20 0 Roth IRAs,201 and various edu-
cation credits. 202
1. Programmatic Incentives
These limits preserve programmatic incentives for taxpayers with
sufficiently low incomes, while eliminating them for everyone else. As
a result, phase-outs and cliffs avoid subsidizing what (some) claimants
would do anyway. High-income claimants need less encouragement
to enter the workforce, seek an education, and save for retirement.
Excluding these claimants can focus the subsidy where it has the most
impact. Indeed, when the goal is to encourage at least a minimum
level of favored activity (for example, so claimants become self-suffi-
cient), a phase-out can be paired with a cap, as with education subsi-
dies, the EITC, and Roth IRAs under current law.20 3
At the same time, phase-outs and cliffs are not a good fit for maxi-
mizing the volume of activity, without regard to who engages in it.
For instance, phasing out the charitable deduction for high-earners
could significantly reduce charitable giving, since these donors have
more capacity to give and are more responsive to financial
incentives. 204
199 IRC § 32(a)(2)(B).
200 IRC § 24(b).
201 IRC § 408A(c)(3).
202 See IRC §§ 25A(d), 25B, 32.
203 See IRC §§ 25A(b)(1), (c)(1) (education subsidies), § 32(b)(1) (EITC), § 25B(a)
(Roth IRA).
204 See John D. McKinnon, Deductions Limits Will Affect Many, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323689604578217850195921128.
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2. Excess Burden
Phase-outs and cliffs also increase the effective marginal tax rate.205
Earning more causes taxpayers to lose deductions, exclusions, or cred-
its.2 °6 The EITC thus creates offsetting incentives: The credit itself
encourages work, but the phase-out has the opposite effect.
3. Distribution
Even so, phase-outs and cliffs can promote distributional goals, es-
pecially when tax expenditures generate mostly private benefits. For
instance, since the EITC is supposed to help claimants, a phase-out
enhances distribution by ensuring they actually need this assistance.
In contrast, the charitable deduction helps third-party beneficiaries
more than claimants. When these beneficiaries have low incomes,
phasing out this subsidy is a counterproductive way to pursue distribu-
tional goals.
4. Trade-offs
Phase-outs and cliffs offer a familiar trade-off between program-
matic benefits and distribution, on one hand, and excess burden, on
the other. These limits permit precise income-based allocations. This
can focus the subsidy where it does the most good, especially when
subsidies generate private benefits. For these individually-based tax
expenditures, the main disadvantage is that phase-outs and cliffs in-
crease effective marginal rates. They also are a poor fit for aggregate
subsidies that increase the overall amount of favored activity, without
regard to who engages in it.
205 See Manning & Andress, note 42, at 1592 ("A phase-out of a deduction is effectively
the same as an adjustment of the tax rate for those otherwise entitled to the deduction.").
206 See id. at 1593 ("Because all exemptions are phased out simultaneously, possibly
reflecting the practical difficulties of doing it seriatim with such a large range, this process
also has the perverse effect that the larger the family, the higher the marginal rate through-
out the phase-out range. Talk about negative family values!"); Daniel N. Shaviro, Effec-
tive Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income Households, Emp't Policies Inst., Feb. 1999, at 1,
13-16, available at https://www.epionline.org/wp-content/studies/shaviro-02-1999.pdf (esti-
mating effective marginal rate of over 100% in increasing income from $10,000 to $25,000,
given phase-out of various state and federal welfare and other benefits, such as Medicaid,
the EITC, Temporary Aid to Needy Families, food stamps, and rent subsidies).
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TABLE 5
PHASE-OUTS AND CLIFFS
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for high activity levels with valuable externalities
Benefits for high activity levels with diminishing returns
Benefits for essential first dollar
Benefits for inframarginal first dollar
Benefits for responsive wealthy claimants
Benefits for inframarginal wealthy claimants
Excess Burden
Increased complexity
Increased cost for favored activity
Bracket creep
Disguised rate increase
Spreading
Bunching
Distribution
Disproportionate cuts for wealthy claimants
Mitigated upside down effect
Cost-effective externalities for low-income third parties
Yes (in theory) 20 7
Yes (in theory)
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
F. Maximum Fraction
Another option is to fund an unlimited amount of the favored activ-
ity, but at a lower rate. For example, although the taxpayer's marginal
rate usually defines the government's share of deductions and exclu-
sions, President Obama has proposed a maximum 28% rate to apply
to certain deductions. 20 8 This Article calls this limit a "maximum frac-
tion," since it specifies a maximum percentage that the government
will reimburse.
1. Programmatic Incentives
President Obama's proposal affects only those in brackets above
28%. It weakens their programmatic incentives, but does not elimi-
nate them. A key question is whether this reduced rate induces the
desired level of favored activity. The answer varies with the context.
All else being equal, the rate should be higher when activities gener-
207 A phase-out becomes a tighter constraint as income rises, but not as activity level
rises. On their own, then, phase-outs do not limit the amount of activity that is subsidized.
But they usually are paired with caps, so it is rare for a tax expenditure that is subject to a
phase-out to support an unlimited level of activity. See 2 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 170th
Cong., Study of the Overall State of the Federal Tax System and Recommendations for
Simplification, Pursuant to Section 8022(3)(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, at 80-
84 tbl.7 (Comm. Print 2001) (describing individual tax provisions with income-based phase-
ins or phase-outs). Even if they did, moreover, the low income of the claimant would itself
constrain how much favored activity is feasible.
208 Office of Mgmt. and Budget, note 55, at 36.
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ate more externalities. At the same time, it should be lower when
claimants are more responsive to tax incentives.
A flaw in the Obama proposal, then, is that 28% is unlikely to be
right for all tax expenditures. Current law has a similar flaw in using
the marginal tax rate as the reimbursement rate (for deductions and
exclusions).2Q 9 There is no reason why the marginal tax rate (or 28%
percent) always would be optimal.210 Instead, we should use different
rates for mortgage interest, health insurance, charity, and other subsi-
dies. 211 To do so, we could use credits with rates tailored to the con-
text. Admittedly, this approach has its own problems. This tailoring
raises administrative costs. The government also may not have the
expertise to distinguish among different subsidies, and would face in-
tense lobbying in doing so. Yet even if the result is not perfect, there
is room to improve on current law.
A further downside is that a maximum fraction accords the same
treatment to the first and last dollar spent on favored activity, even if
the relevant elasticities or externalities vary. As a result, this limit is
more likely than a floor to subsidize what claimants would do anyway
(such as the first dollar of charity). Unlike a cap, it subsidizes an un-
limited amount of favored activity, which is undesirable when margi-
nal externalities decline (as with gold-plated health insurance).
2. Excess Burden
Like other limits, a maximum fraction can complicate the calcula-
tion of tax liability, although tax preparation software alleviates this
cost. Even so, a maximum fraction has an advantage over caps and
floors: It does not create an incentive to shift spending from one year
to another. Under the Obama proposal, each dollar of deductions is
still worth 28 cents (for those in higher brackets), whether we concen-
trate two years of deductions into a single year or spread them evenly
209 Admittedly, there might be some correlation. For instance, tax-sensitive people may
be more responsive not only in their labor supply decisions, but also in their use of tax
expenditures. See Slemrod & Kopczuk, note 138, at 106-07 (positing that elasticity may be
controllable instead of a pure preference). If all else were equal, then, we would want
lower rates-both tax rates and subsidy rates-for those who are especially tax-sensitive.
Yet even for them, we should be concerned that elasticities of labor supply differ from
those for subsidized activities, such that the rates should be different.
210 See Saez, note 31, at 2659 ("There is no theoretical reason to link the subsidy rate on
the contribution good to the income tax rate as is currently done in the US income tax
code."); see also Batchelder et al., note 10, at 28 ("It is extremely unlikely that externalities
and elasticities change in an abrupt and discontinuous fashion exactly at the point of zero
income tax liability or the marginal tax rate thresholds.").
211 In other work, I have discussed the potential advantages of this approach for charita-
ble subsidies. See Schizer, note 36, at 239-41.
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across both years. In other words, a maximum fraction avoids the
bunching and spreading associated with floors and caps. 212
A maximum fraction differs from caps and floors in another respect
as well: It does not disallow (or authorize) more deductions as claim-
ants earn more. For instance, by earning another dollar, and thus
moving from the 28% bracket to the 33% bracket, claimants do not
lose any deductions. As a result, a maximum fraction does not change
the effective marginal rate in the way that income-based floors and
caps do. Yet a maximum fraction obviously makes some deductions
less valuable than they otherwise would be. As a result, this limit in-
creases the cost of previously-subsidized consumption. 213 It also im-
poses a form of bracket creep, since claimants can no longer use
itemized deductions to avoid moving from the 28% bracket to the
33% bracket. 214
3. Distribution
A maximum fraction can enhance distribution by offering a more
uniform tax benefit to claimants with different incomes. Under Presi-
dent Obama's proposal, for instance, claimants in the 28% bracket
receive the same tax benefit as claimants in higher brackets. Put an-
other way, a maximum fraction disallows more tax benefits for those
in higher bracket (for example, the Obama proposal disallows 11.6%
212 For similar reasons, it also avoids the incentive to spread, discussed above, that can
arise even without a cap: Bunching can move claimants to a lower bracket, thereby reduc-
ing the value of deductions or exclusions. Yet the Obama proposal eliminates this issue for
claimants in the top three brackets. See Office of Mgmt. and Budget, note 55, at 36.
Whether they stay in their current bracket or move to a lower one, their deductions and
exclusions are still worth 28%. This value declines only if they move to a bracket below
28%.
213 For example, if someone wants to use their last dollar of earnings to pay mortgage
interest, but a maximum fraction reduces the tax benefit, the purchasing power of this
marginal dollar of earnings-and thus the return to working more-is reduced. See Sub-
section III.C.l.e.
214 Under the proposal taxpayers would determine their tax bracket based on their in-
come before they subtract their itemized deductions (that is, using AGI instead of taxable
income). For example, since the 33% bracket applies to income above $186,350, consider a
taxpayer who has an AGI of exactly $186,350, and also has $10,000 of itemized deductions.
Toder et al., note 40, at 820, 822, 827. Under the Obama proposal, an additional dollar of
income is taxed at 33%. In contrast, under current law, this additional dollar is taxed at
28% because brackets are applied to taxable income (that is, AGI minus itemized deduc-
tions), and not to AGI (the prededuction amount). IRC §§ 1, 63(a). As a result, under
current law-but not under the Obama proposal-deductions can keep taxpayers from
moving up to the 33% bracket: AGI is $186,357, but taxable income (that is, AGI minus
$10,000 of itemized deductions) is only $176,357. Under current law, then, a dollar of de-
ductions is reducing tax by 33 cents-something that President Obama's proposal does not
allow. In contrast, instead of applying the brackets after subtracting deductions, the
Obama proposal would apply the brackets to AGI, calculate the tax, and then separately
subtract an amount equal to 28% of the itemized deductions (28% of $10,000 or $2800).
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in the 39.6% bracket, but only 7% in the 35% bracket). Even so,
claimants in lower brackets would still receive a less generous tax ben-
efit. A dollar of deductions would still be worth 15 cents to claimants
in the 15% bracket, but its value would become the same 28 cents for
claimants in the 28%, 35% and 39.6% brackets. As a result, the "up-
side down effect" would be mitigated but not eliminated.
Again, the distributional analysis becomes more complicated when
one focuses on economic benefits, instead of tax benefits. By cutting
the reimbursement rate, maximum fractions can reduce the volume of
favored activity. This has an adverse effect on low-income third par-
ties who benefit from it (as with charity to soup kitchens).
4. Trade-offs
A maximum fraction is, in a sense, a compromise between floors
and caps. Instead of preserving programmatic incentives for high
levels of activity (like floors), or eliminating them (like caps), a maxi-
mum fraction preserves them, but at a reduced level. This limit's ef-
fects on excess burden and distribution are comparably moderate. A
maximum fraction does not encourage bunching or spreading, or alter
effective marginal rates in the way that an income-based floor or a cap
does. Although a maximum fraction targets only high-income taxpay-
ers (for example, above the 28% bracket in the Obama proposal), it
does not eliminate their subsidy (as phase-outs do). Likewise, this
limit mitigates the upside down effect, but does not eliminate it.215
TABLE 6
MAXIMUM FRACTION
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for high activity levels with valuable externalities Yes (but reduced)
Benefits for high activity levels with diminishing returns Yes (but reduced)
Benefits for essential first dollar Yes (but reduced)
Benefits for inframarginal first dollar Yes (but reduced)
Benefits for responsive wealthy claimants Yes (but reduced)
Benefits for inframarginal wealthy claimants Yes (but reduced)
Excess Burden
Increased complexity Yes
Increased cost for favored activity Yes
Bracket creep Yes
Disguised rate increase No
215 In a simulation, Eric Toder, Joseph Rosenberg, and Amanda Eng raise $83.4 billion
with a 19.2% rate-based fraction, concluding that 89% of the impact is on the top 20%, and
41.4% is on the top 1%. This is significantly more progressive than a haircut and an in-
come-based limit, but less progressive than a fixed-dollar limit. Toder et al., note 40, at
820, 822, 827.
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Spreading No
Bunching No
Distribution
Disproportionate cuts for wealthy claimants Yes (but reduced)
Mitigated upside down effect Yes
Cost-effective externalities for low-income third parties Yes (but reduced)
G. Haircuts
Finally, instead of setting a maximum tax benefit for a favored ex-
pense (for example, 28 cents per dollar), we could disallow a fixed
percentage of it. Under current law, for instance, only 50% of busi-
ness-related entertainment expenses can be deducted. 216 A similar
"haircut" can be applied to any deduction, exclusion, or credit. For
example, we could exclude only 50% of health insurance premiums
funded by employers.21 7
1. Programmatic Incentives
Like maximum fractions, haircuts weaken programmatic incentives,
but do not eliminate them. A haircut is useful, then, when the margi-
nal reimbursement rate otherwise would be too high. This can be true
when claimants are especially responsive, so a lower subsidy still of-
fers sufficient motivation.218 In addition, a subsidy generally should
equal the marginal positive externalities it generates. If another dollar
of mortgage interest generates only 10 cents of positive externalities,
the marginal subsidy should be 10%. A haircut can bring us closer to
this optimal level.
It would be cleaner, though, to use a credit that specifies the rate we
want. With this approach, we do not need a haircut. After all, if we
want the subsidy to be 20%, we can simply use a 20% credit, instead
of a 40% credit with a 50% haircut. In contrast, with deductions and
exclusions, a uniform haircut generates a different reimbursement rate
in each bracket. For example, a 50% haircut creates a 17.5% reim-
bursement rate in the 35% bracket, but only a 7.5% reimbursement
rate in the 15% bracket. Just as the marginal tax rates themselves are
unlikely to be optimal for a given subsidy, fractions of these rates also
are unlikely to be optimal. A haircut that yields the right reimburse-
ment rate in one bracket could yield the wrong rate in another
216 IRC § 274(n).
217 The alternative minimum tax also is a haircut of sorts, although the fraction disal-
lowed varies with a number of factors, including the AMT and regular marginal tax rates,
as well the amount of tax preferences the taxpayer has. For a discussion of the AMT, see
Hines & Logue, note 1, at 1-10.
218 See Brian Galle, Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 67 Tax L. Rev. 53, 61 (2013).
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bracket. In theory, different brackets could use different haircuts but,
again, it is more straightforward to use a credit with the desired rate
schedule.
Haircuts have another limitation as well: They offer the same sub-
sidy for low- and high-activity levels. In this way, haircuts resemble
maximum fractions and differ starkly from caps and floors. As a re-
sult, haircuts risk subsidizing what claimants would do anyway (such
as the first dollar of charity), or funding high levels of activity that
yield fewer marginal externalities (such as gold-plated health
insurance).
2. Excess Burden
This difference between haircuts, on one hand, and caps and floors,
on the other, means these limits affect excess burden in different ways
as well. For example, income-based caps authorize more deductions
as claimants earn more. Yet haircuts do not reduce the effective mar-
ginal tax rate in this way. By earning more, a claimant cannot some-
how turn a 50% haircut into a 30% haircut.
If anything, haircuts become a tighter constraint as claimants earn
more. Since deductions and exclusions offer more generous tax bene-
fits in higher brackets, the tax benefit disallowed by a haircut becomes
more valuable as claimants earn more. For example, losing 50% of
the mortgage interest deduction costs more in the 39.6% bracket than
in the 15% bracket (19.8 cents versus 7.5 cents per dollar).
In imposing a heavier burden on high-income claimants, then, hair-
cuts are more like income-based floors, which disallow more deduc-
tions as claimants earn more. Yet floors and haircuts are by no means
the same. While haircuts become more burdensome as taxpayers
move to a higher bracket, they accord the same treatment to claimants
in the same bracket. Income-based floors, by contrast, differentiate
even among claimants in the same bracket. For example, assume a
claimant in the top bracket (earning $500,000) contributes $50,000 to
charity, and is subject either to a 10% haircut or a 1% floor. Each
limit would disallow $5000 of charitable deductions, raising the tax bill
by $1980. But what happens if the claimant earns an additional
$1000? The income-based floor would disallow another $10 of deduc-
tions, raising tax by $3.96. In contrast, nothing changes with the hair-
cut, which still disallows $5000 of deductions. Like maximum
fractions, then, haircuts do not change the effective marginal rate in
this way.
Similarly, haircuts do not encourage bunching or spreading in the
same way that floors and caps do. A haircut disallows the same per-
centage of deductions, whether they are concentrated in a single year
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or spread across multiple years. Unlike with a floor (or cap), this per-
centage cannot be reduced by concentrating (or spreading) deduc-
tions. In the example above, the claimant can reduce the percentage
of deductions she loses under the 1% floor-from 10% to 5%-by
contributing $100,000 in a single year, instead of $50,000 this year and
$50,000 next year.219 Yet under the 10% haircut, she loses 10% either
way. 220
Notwithstanding these differences, haircuts share three effects on
excess burden with all the limits discussed so far. First, like these
other limits, a haircut can increase the after-tax cost of favored activ-
ity, thereby influencing work and savings choices.22 1 Second, in disal-
lowing a portion of a claimant's deductions or exclusions, a haircut
can move a claimant into a higher tax bracket.2 22 (Limits on credits
do not have this effect, as discussed above.) Third, any limit can com-
plicate the calculation of tax liability, although tax preparation
software alleviates this concern.
3. Distribution
Unlike maximum fractions, which focus on higher brackets, haircuts
apply to all brackets. They differ from maximum fractions, then, in
reducing tax benefits claimed by low-income claimants. Even so, a
haircut has more impact on high-bracket claimants, since their deduc-
tions and exclusions-and, therefore, the fraction disallowed by a
haircut-are worth more. For example, a 50% haircut on a dollar of
deductions costs 17.5 cents in the 35 % bracket but only 14 cents in the
28% bracket. Thus, although a haircut preserves the so-called "upside
down" effect-since tax benefits still correlate with the marginal tax
rate-it burdens high-income claimants more for the same reason.
Again, the distributional analysis becomes more complicated when
the focus is on economic benefits instead of tax benefits. Like maxi-
mum fractions, haircuts cut the marginal reimbursement rate. This
can lower the level of favored activity, which (in some cases) will elim-
inate externalities benefitting low-income people.
219 If she contributes $50,000 each year, she loses 1% of her income (or $5000) in both
years, for a total of $10,000. But if she contributes $100,000 in one year, she loses only
$5000 in that year, and $0 in the next year.
220 She either loses $10,000 in a single year (on the $100,000 contribution), or $5000 each
year (on the two $50,000 contributions). As noted above, bunching can have the disadvan-
tage of bringing a taxpayer into a lower bracket, so the value of the deduction is reduced.
This effect, which is different from the one described in the text, endures under a haircut,
but in somewhat diminished form (since the haircut reduces the deduction's value
anyway).
221 See note 188.
222 See Subsection III.C.l.c.
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4. Trade-offs
Like maximum fractions, haircuts also carve out a middle position
between floors and caps. They reduce programmatic incentives with-
out eliminating them. In addition, haircuts do not encourage bunch-
ing or spreading, or affect the marginal tax rate, in the way income-
based floors and caps do. Unlike maximum fractions, though, haircuts
apply to all brackets. Even so, the deductions and exclusions they
partially disallow are worth more in higher brackets.223
TABLE 7
HAIRCUTS
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for high activity levels with valuable externalities
Benefits for high activity levels with diminishing returns
Benefits for essential first dollar
Benefits for inframarginal first dollar
Benefits for responsive wealthy claimants
Benefits for inframarginal wealthy claimants
Excess Burden
Increased complexity
Increased cost for favored activity
Bracket creep
Disguised rate increase
Spreading
Bunching
Distribution
Disproportionate cuts for wealthy claimants
Mitigated upside down effect
Cost-effective externalities for low-income third parties
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes (but reduced)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (in a sense)224
No
No
Yes
Yes (in a sense)
Yes
V. IMPLICATIONS: "GRAND SLAM" OPPORTUNITIES, TRADE-OFFS, AND
THE VALUE OF CONTEXT-SPECIFIC TAILORING
A. Grand Slam Opportunities
In some cases, when we limit a tax expenditure, all the goals align.
We can save money while preserving programmatic benefits, mitigat-
ing excess burden, and enhancing distribution. This Article identifies
223 Toder, Rosenberg, and Eng raise $85 billion with a 29.5% haircut, and find that
71.7% of the impact is on the top 20% (compared with 71.5% for an income-based cap and
94.9% for a fixed-dollar cap). They estimate that 24.9% comes from the top 1% (com-
pared with 28.8% for an income-based cap and 71.4% for a fixed-dollar cap). Toder et al.,
note 40, at 820, 822, 827.
224 By earning more, and thus moving to a higher bracket, a claimant loses a portion of a
more valuable deduction, as noted above. Yet unlike income-based floors and phase-outs,
haircuts do not increase the effective marginal rate of a claimant who stays in the same
bracket.
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two circumstances in which these grand slam situations arise. In the
first, programmatic benefits are not worth preserving. This can be
true if a tax expenditure pursues unwise goals or, for that matter, if it
pursues valuable goals ineffectively.
In the second "grand slam" scenario, programmatic benefits are val-
uable, but only at low activity levels. Depending on the relevant em-
pirics, subsidized health insurance, retirement savings, and mortgage
interest could all involve declining marginal externalities. 225 If this is
the case, caps can save money while largely preserving programmatic
benefits. Admittedly, caps can add to compliance costs and also can
increase effective marginal tax rates in some ways (for example,
bracket creep). But unlike phase-outs and income-based floors, caps
are not mathematically equivalent to a rate increase; on the contrary,
income-based caps reduce effective marginal tax rates. Caps also im-
prove distribution if they disproportionately burden high-income tax-
payers. This may be true of caps on health insurance, retirement
savings, and mortgage interest.226 After all, high-income claimants
disproportionately claim these tax expenditures. When a tax expendi-
ture satisfies these empirical parameters, capping it can save revenue,
enhance progressivity, and preserve valuable externalities, while ad-
ding only modestly to excess burden.
B. Trade-offs and the Value of Context-Specific Tailoring
Yet in other cases, there is tension among the competing goals. The
seven limits discussed in Part IV strike different balances among
programmatic benefits, excess burden, and distribution.
They all have four common effects: First, they raise revenue; sec-
ond, they increase the after-tax cost of the favored activity; third, they
can move a claimant into a higher tax bracket; fourth, they add com-
plexity to the tax system by introducing another rule that must be un-
derstood and enforced, although some of these limits can also have
the offsetting effect of simplifying the law (for example, as floors do in
eliminating the need for recordkeeping).
Yet despite these commonalities, these limits have quite different
effects on programmatic incentives. For high activity levels, some
eliminate the subsidy (fixed-dollar caps and income-based caps);,
others do not change it (fixed-dollar floors and income-based floors);
and still others preserve it in weakened form (maximum fractions and
haircuts). Likewise, for the first dollar of activity, some withhold the
subsidy (income-based floors and fixed-dollar floors); others maintain
225 See Subsection III.B.6.
226 See Section IV.C.
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it (fixed-dollar caps and income-based caps); and others weaken but
do not eliminate it (maximum fractions and haircuts).
These limits also affect excess burden in different ways. Some are
mathematically equivalent to a marginal rate cut (income-based caps)
or increase (income-based floors, phase-outs, and arguably haircuts as
well); in contrast, others do not influence the effective marginal tax
rate in this way (fixed-dollar caps, fixed-dollar floors, and maximum
fractions). Some limits encourage bunching (income-based floors and
fixed-dollar floors) or spreading (income-based caps and fixed-dollar
caps), and others do not have either effect (phase-outs, maximum
fractions, and haircuts).
These limits also influence distribution in different ways. Some
deny the subsidy to high-income claimants (phase-outs) or otherwise
disproportionately reduce their tax benefits (fixed-dollar caps, maxi-
mum fractions, and haircuts), while others do not (income-based
floors, fixed-dollar floors, and income-based caps). The table below
summarizes these various effects.
TABLE 8
THE DIVERSE EFFECTS OF SEVEN DIFFERENT LIMITS
Fixed-
Dollar
Floors
Programmatic Benefits
Benefits for high
activity levels with
valuable externalities
Benefits for high
activity levels with
diminishing returns
Benefits for essential
first dollar
Benefits for
inframarginal first
dollar
Benefits for responsive
wealthy claimants
Benefits for
inframarginal wealthy
claimants
Excess Burden
Increased complexity
Increased cost for
favored activity
Bracket creep
Income-
Based
Floors
Fixed-
Dollar
Caps
Income-
Based
Caps
Yes Yes No No
Phase-
Outs
and
Cliffs
Maximum
Fractions
Yes (in Yes (but
theory) reduced)
Yes Yes No No Yes (in Yes (but
theory) reduced)
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes (but
reduced)
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes (but
reduced)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes No Yes (but
reduced)
Yes Yes No Yes (but
reduced)
Haircuts
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes (but
reduced)
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Disguised rate increase No Yes No No Yes No Yes (in
a sense)
Spreading No No Yes Yes No No No
Bunching Yes Yes No No No No No
Distribution
Disproportionate cuts No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
for wealthy claimants
Mitigated upside down No No No No Yes Yes Yes (in
effect a sense)
Cost-effective Yes Yes No No No Yes (but Yes (but
externalities for low- reduced) reduced)
income third parties
Since each limit involves a different mix of trade-offs, we should
pick the limit (or combination of limits) that is the best fit for a partic-
ular tax expenditure. For example, a phase-out has the advantage of
focusing a subsidy on those who most need it, but the disadvantage of
raising effective marginal rates. This balance of benefits and costs is
more plausible for subsidies that generate private benefits, such as the
EITC. It is less appealing for subsidies that generate externalities for
low-income claimants, such as charity for soup kitchens.
Likewise, a well-crafted floor on the charitable deduction can save
money while (largely) preserving incentives to give. Yet floors also
trigger welfare costs. Since the mix of costs varies for different floors,
we need to pick our poison. For example, a fixed-dollar floor has the
disadvantage of not adjusting to a claimant's giving capacity. But it
has the offsetting advantage of not raising the effective marginal rate
in the way income-based floors do. Likewise, if we set the floor at a
low level, we save less money and subsidize more inframarginal con-
tributions. But a higher floor triggers more bunching. High floors
also keep us from motivating donors whose marginal contributions
would be below the floor. We need to weigh these competing effects
in order to choose the right limit.
As these examples illustrate, we should tailor each limit to the con-
text, since every tax expenditure involves a different mix of externali-
ties and elasticities. For similar reasons, we may also want a different
marginal reimbursement rate for each tax expenditure. While admin-
istrative and information costs limit how much tailoring we can do, the
right number is unlikely to be the marginal tax rate, as discussed
above.
In setting marginal reimbursement rates, and also in crafting limits,
we also should remember that the relevant facts can change. Over the
past thirty years, for example, many tax expenditures have stopped
providing tax benefits to middle- and low-income claimants; the rea-
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son, noted above, is that marginal tax rates have been cut so substan-
tially. When essential facts change, we may need to adjust the limit or
the marginal reimbursement rate (or both). We have reason, then, to
re-evaluate these issues periodically.
C. Basket Limits
The value of context-specific tailoring has another implication: We
should be skeptical of basket limits. Although they may be good
politics, as discussed above, they are not usually good policy. 227 The
problem is that baskets are a clumsy way to calibrate the level of fa-
vored activity. To see why, assume a subsidy of X induces the optimal
level of health insurance, while Y induces the optimal level of retire-
ment savings. What happens if we set a single basket limit, X + Y, for
these two activities combined? A taxpayer can spend all of X and Y
on health insurance and nothing on retirement savings, or vice versa.
Given the blunt incentives they create, basket limits are not easy to
justify (setting politics aside). One potential rationale is that they al-
low taxpayers to choose the tax expenditures they value the most. Yet
choice is counterproductive if it undercuts the purpose of the limit.
For example, if we do not want to subsidize the first dollar of charity,
a floor that can be met with other deductions does not keep the first
charitable dollar from being subsidized.228
Alternatively, the advantage of basket limits may be that claimants
are less likely to notice them. If so, the government may be able to
change behavior on the cheap, inducing favored activity without actu-
ally paying for it. Yet claimants presumably will notice eventually;
they could be tipped off, for example, by advisors, media coverage, or
unexpectedly high tax bills. When they realize their error, claimants
could start worrying about hidden traps in other subsidies (even when
there are none). This erosion of trust could make it harder, and more
expensive, to motivate them again.
Finally, the case for basket limits may lie in administrative savings.
With baskets, we avoid the cost of crafting multiple limits, and of po-
licing the lines among different tax expenditures. Even so, it does not
seem especially difficult to craft a separate limit for each tax expendi-
227 See Toder et al., note 40, at 811 ("[A]cross-the-board limits on spending ... may
make it politically easier to sustain spending cuts. Overall limits on spending or tax ex-
penditures are suboptimal ways to reduce deficits because they equally cut high-value and
low-value activities. No well-functioning organization, either private or governmental,
would reduce its costs in this manner. . . . And if tax expenditures more often than not
misallocate resources, overall limits on them could yield net improvement in the tax system
and budgetary policy, even while falling far short of the ideal.").
228 For example, the Pease rule's 3% floor can be met with state income taxes. See IRC
§ 68.
[Vol. 68:
LIMITING TAX EXPENDITURES
ture, or to determine whether a payment is mortgage interest instead
of charity.229 At the same time, any administrative savings we reap
comes at a cost: Baskets can warp the relevant incentives, as noted
above. As a result, it seems unlikely that the administrative savings
from baskets routinely offset the programmatic costs of having blunter
incentives. Yet like so many issues in this Article, this is an empirical
question that should be resolved with context-specific analysis.
D. Empirical Research
Needless to say, the centrality of empirical questions is a recurring
theme in this Article. Since empirical research on the right questions
can add a lot of value, Treasury should devote more resources to this
research. It also should provide more data to academic partners, and
can consider grants and other support as well.
E. Should Benefits Vary by Income? A Response to Batchelder,
Goldberg, and Orszag
Finally, the importance of context has still another implication:
When externalities and elasticity vary systematically with income, the
marginal reimbursement rate should vary as well. However, Lily
Batchelder, Fred Goldberg, and Peter Orszag resist this sort of in-
come-based tailoring, at least as a general matter. Instead, they rec-
ommend using refundable credits as a default practice, so the same
marginal reimbursement rate applies to everyone. 230 They accept in-
come-based variation only based on "specific knowledge that [high-
income] households are more responsive to the incentive or that their
engaging in the behavior generates larger social benefits. '231 But they
consider this the exception, not the rule. In defending uniformity as a
default, they ground their argument in efficiency. 232 They claim that
uniformity minimizes the risk of large errors, and thus reduces distor-
tions, which are a function of the square of errors.
Default rules are more appealing, though, if they are correct most
of the time. As a result, a key question is how often elasticities and
externalities vary with income. Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag's
proposal is more compelling if these variations are rare, but variations
are likely to be common for a number of reasons. For example, if the
229 See Kaplow, note 183, at 26-29 (noting that policing the lines among tax expenditures
is not difficult).
230 Batchelder et al., note 10, at 27 n.16 (noting the "default assumption" should be that
"underlying price elasticities and behavior do not vary systematically across income
distribution").
231 Id. at 24.
232 See id. at 47-48 (grounding case in efficiency, rather than in distribution).
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goal of a subsidy is to provide private benefits, subsidizing low-income
claimants usually is preferable. The same is true if the goal is to en-
courage self-sufficiency; since high-income claimants are likely to
enter the workforce or save for retirement on their own, more exter-
nalities are generated in focusing on low-income claimants. In con-
trast, instead of targeting those who are most in need, we sometimes
target those who are most responsive. In these cases, we have reason
to focus on high-income claimants. Whether these scenarios are typi-
cal or unusual is, of course, an empirical question which this Article
does not seek to resolve definitively. Yet there certainly are a number
of contexts where externalities and elasticities do vary with income.
Even so, Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag offer another argument
for uniformity: Even if elasticity and externalities do vary with in-
come, uniformity is better if we are unsure how they vary. Neverthe-
less, this argument is persuasive only if we have no idea whether to
subsidize low- or high-income claimants. Batchelder, Goldberg and
Orszag rely on just such an example. They assume a 10 cents subsidy
should be given either to a high-income group (H) or a low-income
group (L), and we have no sense of which is more likely. On these
facts, Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag show that giving 5 cents to
each group (and thus undersubsidizing by five cents each time) mini-
mizes deadweight loss: Five cents, after all, is the mean of the possible
shortfalls in the subsidy (that is, 10 cents or zero). 233 But the key as-
sumption in their example-the reason why uniformity is the error-
minimizing default-is that H and L are equally plausible.
However, this analysis no longer holds when we have at least some
sense of which income cohort should be funded. In this case, uniform-
ity no longer minimizes distortions. For instance, assume L should get
more of the subsidy, but we do not know how much more. There is a
50% chance that 75% should go to L and 25% should go to H. There
also is a 50% chance that all should go to L. On these facts, uniform-
ity (5 and 5) does not minimize errors or deadweight loss. 234 Instead,
233 As a result, always undersubsidizing by 5 cents minimizes the square of deviations
(and thus deadweight loss) at 25. (The deadweight loss is the square of the errors, or 1/2(5
x 5) + 1/2(5 x 5) = 25.) By contrast, if we give the full subsidy to one group, we have a 50%
chance of being right and a 50% chance of undersubsidizing by ten cents, which generates
twice as much deadweight loss (that is, 50). (Deadweight loss = 1/2(10 x 10) + 1/2 (0 x 0) =
50.) See id. at 47-48 ("Although the expected error would be the same irrespective of
whether the entire subsidy was given to one group or spread evenly over both groups, the
expected deadweight loss would be minimized by a uniform subsidy because the loss from
failing to correct for a positive externality rises with the square of the uncorrected
externality.").
234 If L should receive the entire subsidy, a 5-5 split undersubsidizes L by 5. But if L
should receive 7.50, a 5-5 split undersubsidizes L by 2.50. As a result, the expected
shortfall in the subsidy is 3.75: 1/2(5) + 1/2(2.5) = 3.75. Expected deadweight loss from the
shortfall is 15.625: 1/2(5 x 5) + 1/2(2.5 x 2.5) = 15.625.
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it is better to split the difference between the most likely scenarios
(8.75 and 1.25).235 Accordingly, when we are able to make even a
rough guess, the default should not be uniformity, but context-specific
tailoring. If externalities and elasticity vary with income, but we are
not sure precisely how, we should use our best estimate of the relevant
facts. A probability-weighted mean of likely outcomes minimizes the
square of deviations.2 36
Admittedly, this "best estimate" approach is not helpful if the rele-
vant elasticities and externalities are a complete mystery. If even a
ballpark estimate is impossible, Batchelder, Goldberg, and Orszag's
argument for uniformity has force. But if we truly have no idea, does
a subsidy really make sense? Before committing scarce resources, we
should have at least a rough prediction of a subsidy's effects. Other-
wise, how can we conclude that it is cost-justified? Once this sort of
prediction is feasible, uniformity is no longer the efficient answer.23 7
Of course, there may be other reasons to favor uniformity, such as a
social welfare function that especially values equal treatment in the
relevant setting. But if we seek to promote equality more generally-
whether to reduce income inequality or to promote economic mobil-
ity-we often should vary the subsidy by income. For example, if a
subsidy provides private benefits (like the EITC), it usually should
favor low-income claimants. In contrast, a subsidy that generates pos-
itive externalities for low-income people (like charity for soup kitch-
ens) should focus on high-income claimants if they are more
responsive. Ultimately, when we decide whether the marginal reim-
bursement rate of a tax expenditure should vary with income, we need
to account for all the issues in this Article's framework. The point
here is merely that we need a context-specific analysis, instead of as-
suming uniformity is the answer.
235 If L should receive the entire subsidy, an 8.75-1.25 split undersubsidizes L by 1.25. If
L should receive 7.50 and H should receive 2.50, an 8.75-1.25 split undersubsidi2es H by
1.25. As a result, the expected shortfall in the subsidy is 1.25: 1/2(1.25) + 1/2(1.25) = 1.25.
Expected deadweight loss falls to 1.5625: 1/2(1.25 x 1.25) + 1/2(1.25 x 1.25) = 1.5625. This is
1/10 the deadweight loss created by the 5-5 split.
This analysis does not treat an overpayment as an error, since that is the approach
Batchelder, Goldberg and Orszag follow. If we do treat overpayment as an error, the
numbers change but the conclusion does not.
236 Cf. Kaplow, note 183, at 14 n.38 ("It is a familiar statistical property that the mean
minimizes the sum of the squares of deviations.").
237 Another potential problem with subsidies that vary by income is that they promote
clientele effects. Those who receive more generous subsidies might outbid others who oth-
erwise value the asset more. See Shaviro, note 39, at 431.
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VI. CONCLUSION
To sum up, then, this Article offers a three-part framework for de-
ciding whether to repeal or limit a tax expenditure. First, what
programmatic benefits would we lose? What positive externalities are
created, and how much would we have without the subsidy? Can we
tighten up the tax expenditure to get all (or most) of the benefits at a
lower cost? Second, do we incur an offsetting welfare cost by increas-
ing excess burden? What are the effects on labor and savings deci-
sions, administrative costs, and planning? Third, do we incur an
offsetting cost in distribution? Who is claiming the tax benefit? What
is the economic incidence of this benefit?
This Article shows that repeal or a limit can sometimes enhance all
of these goals. These grand slam opportunities can arise, for instance,
when we can repeal a tax expenditure that offers only meager
programmatic benefits, and also when we cap a tax expenditure whose
marginal programmatic benefits decline significantly as an individual
engages in more of the favored activity.
In other settings, the elements of this Article's framework are often
in tension with each other. Steps to preserve programmatic incen-
tives, for example, might increase excess burden or undercut distribu-
tional goals (or both). This Article also shows that various limits
balance these trade-offs in different ways. Income-based caps have
essentially the opposite effects as income-based floors, while maxi-
mum fractions are a compromise between the two. We should choose
the trade-off that yields the most favorable balance of benefits and
costs in a particular context.
Given these nuances, it is important to tailor limits to the context.
This is less feasible for limits that apply to baskets, instead of expendi-
ture-specific limits. For similar reasons, this Article counsels against
tax expenditures that are uniform at all income levels, since externali-
ties and elasticity are likely to vary with income.
The bottom line, then, is that limits need to be fine-tuned to account
for externalities, elasticity, administrative costs, labor and savings de-
cisions, planning, and distribution. Admittedly, the relevant facts will
not always be known, at least with certainty. We will have to make
the best judgments we can with limited information. Although the
results will not be perfect, we should be able to improve on current
law.
A key question, of course, is whether we have the political will to
repeal or limit tax expenditures that are not cost-justified. These tax
expenditures are jealously guarded by interest groups, who will resist
repeal or limits in predictable ways. In ordinary fiscal conditions,
their higher stakes would give them a formidable political edge. But
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these are somewhat unusual times. Soaring national debt and anemic
economic growth, sobering as they are, may offer an opportunity.
These challenges can focus popular attention on what otherwise
would be obscure debates. This higher profile is crucial in repealing
or limiting a tax expenditure that is not cost-justified. Voters who
have no direct stake in it must become a political counterweight to
those who do. These seemingly unaffected voters must come to recog-
nize that they will pay the price - in the form of higher tax rates,
spending cuts, or more deficit spending - if we do not repeal or limit
someone else's sacred cow. This insight could motivate the
uninvolved to become involved. While it is too optimistic to consider
this outcome inevitable, it is too pessimistic to rule it out. If it hap-
pens, we should not let the opportunity go to waste.
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APPENDIX
2 38
Tax Expenditure FY 2014 Cost (Billions)
Business Investments
Dividends and Long-Term Capital Gains 96.5239
Domestic Production Expenses 16.8240
Expensing Depreciable Business Property 7.0241
(IRC § 179)
Research Activities Credit (IRC § 41) 5.5242
Research and Experimental Expenditures 4.7243
Deduction
Charity
Charitable Contributions Other than for 35.8244
Education and Health Care
Charitable Contributions for Education 6.3245
Charitable Contributions for Health Care 4.8246
Education
Employer-Provided Education Assistance 1.5247
and Tuition Reduction
Parental Personal Exemption for Students 4.7248
Aged 19-23
Post-Secondary Education Tuition Credit 23.0249
Savings Exclusions and Coverdell .1250
238 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 21-34, tbl.1 (offering tax expenditure estimates by
budget function). In some cases, the number represents the sum of both the corporate and
personal income tax revenue.
239 Id. at 27.
240 Id. ($12.2 billion for corporations plus $4.6 billion for individuals).
241 Id. at 26 ($2.5 billion for corporations plus $4.5 billion for individuals).
242 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 113th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2012-17, at 30 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2013), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications
.html?func=startdown&id=4503 ($5.4 billion for corporations and $.1 billion for individuals
estimated for 2014). Since this credit expired on December 31, 2013, the Joint Committee
did not include it in its 2014 estimate. Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 10, 23 tbl.1. But
the credit was renewed in December 2014, retroactively for all of 2014. Federal Research
Credit Extended Through 2014, American Tax Credit News, Dec. 23, 2014, available at
http://www.taxcreditadvisors.com/federal-research-credit-extended-december-31-2014-hr-
5771-s-83/.
243 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, note 51, at 23 tbl.1 ($4.6 billion for corporations plus $.1
billion for individuals).
244 Id. at 31 ($1 billion for corporations plus $34.8 billion for individuals).
245 Id. at 29 ($.3 billion for corporations plus $6 billion for individuals).
246 Id. at 31 ($1.8 billion for corporations plus $3 billion for individuals).
247 Id. at 29 ($1.2 billion for employer-provided education assistance and $.3 billion for
tuition reductions).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 30.
250 Id. at 29.
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Scholarship and Fellowship Income 2.6251
Exclusion
Student Loan Interest 1.7252
Employment
Cafeteria Plan Benefits 34.5253
Miscellaneous Fringe Benefits 7.3254
Meals and Lodging 2.0255
Green Energy
Energy Credit and Renewable Electricity 1.8256
Production
Energy Efficient Improvements to 1.8257
Residential Property
Plug-in Hybrids 0.2258
Health Care
Employer-provided Health Insurance 143 259
Exclusion
Health Savings Accounts 1.6260
Medical Expenses and Long-Term Care 9.9261
Deduction
Medicare Benefits Exclusion 61 262
Self-Employed Deduction 5.4263
Worker's Compensation 4.8264
Small Business Credit 0.9265
Health Exchange Subsidies 15.5266
Housing
Low-Income Housing 7.1267
Home Mortgage Interest 67.8268
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 30.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 23 ($.5 billion for corporations and $.1 billion for individuals for energy credit;
$1.1 billion for corporations and $.1 billion for renewable energy production).
257 Id. at 23-24 ($.6 billion for existing residential properties, $1.1 for energy-efficient
property credit and $.1 billion for advanced-energy property credit).
258 Id. at 24.
259 Id. at 31.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 32. ($31.8 billion for hospital insurance, $22.7 billion for supplementary
medical insurance and $6.5 billion for prescription drug insurance).
263 Id. at 31.
264 Id.
265 Id. ($.1 billion for corporations and $.8 billion for individuals).
266 Id.
267 Id. at 26 ($6.8 billion for corporations and $.3 billion for individuals).
268 Id. at 25.
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Exclusion of Capital Gains on Principal 24.1269
Residence
Property Taxes 31.9270
Retirement Savings
IRAs 17.9271
Pension Contributions Exclusion 76.7272
Social Security and Railroad Benefits 37.4273
Exclusion
Social Services and Income Support
Child Credit 57.3274
Child and Dependent Care 4.6275
Disability and Public Assistance Benefits 3.4276
Exclusion
EITC 69.2277
State and Local Governments
Municipal Bond Interest Exclusion 33.1278
(General Bonds)
State and Local (Nonbusiness) Income 56.5279
Taxes
Transportation
Employer-Paid Transportation Benefits 4.9280
269 Id. at 26.
270 Id. at 25.
271 Id. at 32 ($11.8 billion for traditional IRAs and $4.9 billion for Roth IRAs and $1.2
billion for elective deferrals).
272 Id. at 32 ($5.8 billion for Keogh plans, $26 billion for defined benefit plans, and $44.9
billion for defined contribution plans).
273 Id. at 33.
274 Id. at 30.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 32.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 33 ($9.3 billion for corporations plus $23.8 billion for individuals).
279 Id.
280 Id. at 28.
